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Abstract
We model the decision problem of a parent who chooses an occupation
andinvestsinthepatienceofherchildren. Thetwochoicescomplementeach
other: patient individuals choose occupations with a steep income proﬁle; a
steep income proﬁle, in turn, leads to a strong incentive to invest in patience.
In equilibrium, societybecomes stratiﬁedalong occupational lines. The most
patient people are those in occupations requiring the most education and
experience. Thetheorycan accountforthedemiseoftheBritishland-owning
aristocracy in the nineteenth century, when rich landowners proved unable
to proﬁt from new opportunities arising with industrialization, and were
thus surpassed by industrialists rising from the middle classes.
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those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1 Introduction
Humans are born impatient. As parents know well, small children live in an eter-
nal present and are incapable of preﬁguring the pleasure that future events can
bring. Learning to be future-oriented and to persevere are essential part of our
upbringing, and parents spend a substantial amount of time instilling patience
into their children. This happens in various forms: deliberate delay of gratiﬁca-
tion, inducing kids to practice to play musical instruments and appreciate clas-
sical music, religious instruction, and encouragement to work hard in schools
are some common examples. Parents’ concern for such human assets comes as
no surprise, as they turn out to be valuable: empirical evidence shows that indi-
viduals who exhibit more patience and perseverance at an early age do better in
life.1
In this paper, we examine the macroeconomic implications of parental invest-
ments in their children’s patience. The notion of patience as an asset in which
agents can invest, what we term “patience capital,” was ﬁrst introduced in the
economic literature by Becker and Mulligan (1997), who consider the problem
of a consumer who lives for a ﬁnite number of periods and makes a one-time
choice of a discount factor. Here, we construct a dynamic dynastic model where
discount factor is treated asa human-capital-like state variable: parents take their
own discount factor as given, but can invest into the patience of their children.
The focus of the theory is on the interaction of this accumulation process with the
choice of occupation and savings. The theory is applied to explain the rise and
decline of a class-based society and, more speciﬁcally, the decline of the British
aristocracy during and after the Industrial Revolution.
The ﬁrst insight of our analysis is that endogenous accumulation of patience cap-
ital can lead to the stratiﬁcation of societies into “social classes,” characterized
by different preferences and occupational choices. This occurs even if all in-
dividuals are initially identical. The second insight is that such differences in
preferences drive the attitudes (or “ethics”) displayed by social classes towards
1See, e.g., Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) and the experimental evidence in Mischel, Shoda,
and Rodriguez (1989), discussed below.
1investments in physical and human capital. In response to episodes of techno-
logical change (such as the Industrial Revolution), endogenous patience can trig-
ger drastic changes in the income distribution, including the “leapfrogging” of a
lower class over the existing wealth elite.
The key feature of our theory is the association between occupations and con-
sumption proﬁles. In some professions, lifetime earnings are relatively ﬂat, while
in others, especially those requiring the acquisition of skills, high returns are
achieved only late in life. These differences affect the incentive of altruistic par-
entsfor investing in theirchildren’spatience capital: the steeperthe consumption
proﬁle faced bytheirchildren, thestronger the incentive forparentsto teachthem
to be patient. The converse is also true: patient agents have a higher propensity
to choose professions entailing steeper earnings and consumption proﬁles. The
dynamic complementarity linking the investment in patience of one generation
and the occupational choice of the next leads to the endogenous formation of “so-
cial classes.” More precisely, dynasties sort into different professions and develop
differentpreferencesover time. Financialmarketdevelopmentplaysa keyrole: if
agents can borrow and perfectly smooth consumption, the link between occupa-
tional choice, consumption proﬁle and investment in patience is severed. Thus,
class-based societies only emerge whenﬁnancial markets are shallow, while well-
functioning ﬁnancial markets lead to homogeneous societies.
From a theoretical standpoint, we view investment in patience as a form of hu-
man capital investment. In standard human capital theory, agents (dynasties)
forego time or utility to increase future enjoyment via higher productivity and
consumption. In the case of patience capital, happiness comes through the abil-
i t yt os a v o rag i v e ns t r e a mo ff u t u r ec o n s umption. However, the accumulation of
patience capital features important differences. Most notably, if a standard time-
separable utility function is assumed, the agents’ value functions are convex in
patience. In spite of this, we can characterize the problem through a standard
recursive formulation with well-deﬁned value functions. The convexity of the
value functions turns out to be a surprisingly useful feature to characterize the
equilibrium.
We apply our theory to the economic decline of the landed British aristocracy
2during and after the Industrial Revolution. In the pre-industrial world, wealth,
prestige, and political power were associated with the possession of land. Over
the nineteenth century the picture changed. A new class of entrepreneurs and
businessmen emerged as the new elite. Wealth and political power became pro-
gressively detached from land ownership. The new capitalist elite mostly rose
from the middle classes: former artisans, merchants, bankers, pre-industrial mas-
ters, but also tenant farmers and yeomen. Few aristocrats served as ﬁnanciers for
the new entrepreneurs, and even this became less common as the century pro-
gressed. The aristocracy lost ground, ﬁrst in relative and eventually in absolute
terms. At ﬁrst sight, this decline is quite puzzling, since the aristocracy was the
wealthy class and could have been expected to be the main beneﬁciary of new
technological opportunities requiring investments.
We argue that differences in time preference can explain this transformation. The
rural aristocracy was too impatient to invest in the new industrial technologies.
The pre-industrial middle class, in contrast, had accumulated more patience cap-
ital and was culturally better prepared to exploit the new opportunities. These
differences, in turn, had their roots in the nature of pre-industrial professions.
For centuries, artisans, craftsmen and merchants (the most common activities of
the pre-industrial middle class) were used to sacriﬁce consumption in their youth
to acquire skills. In contrast, unskilled laborers, but also landowners, had ﬂat in-
come proﬁles. Consequently, middle-class parents had the strongest incentive
for instilling patience in their children, and the middle class became the patient
class. While patience capital was a latent attribute in the pre-industrial world,
it became a key asset when new opportunities of enrichment through capital in-
vestment arose at the outset of the Industrial Revolution. The rise of the patient
bourgeoisie and the demise of the prodigal aristocracy were the consequent out-
comes.
In the following section, we relate our work to the existing literature. In Section 3
we analyze a an adult’s decision problem of choosing an occupation and invest-
ing in a child’s patience in partial equilibrium. In Section 4 we introduce general
equilibrium, and embed the decision problem in a medieval economy populated
by landowners, agricultural workers, and artisans. Section 5 introduces capital
3accumulation. We show that if a new, “capitalist” technology is introduced in the
medieval economy, the patient artisans turn into capitalists, while the landown-
ers and workers are left behind. Historical evidence is discussed in Section 6, and
Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
A key part of our theory is that patience is important for economic success and
can be transmitted from parents to children. Patience can be regarded as a com-
ponent of a broader set of non-cognitive skills determining how well people can
focus on long-term tasks, behave in social interactions, and exert self-restraint.
Recent empirical studies emphasize the importance of such human assets for
economic success. Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) and Heckman, Hsee, and
Rubinstein (2003) use data from the General Educational Development (GED)
testing program in the US, and ﬁnd that non-cognitive skills are responsible for
signiﬁcant differences in wages and education achievements across individuals
of equal measured ability (IQ).2 Similar ﬁndings emerge from Bowles and Gintis
(1976) and Segal (2004). The latter recent study uses measures of non-cognitive
abilities at early ages (including proxies for patience), and ﬁnd them to be quan-
titatively as important as differences in intellectual capability in explaining later
success in education and professional life. Experimental evidence points at sim-
ilar conclusions. In a longitudinal study which began in the 1960s at Stanford
University led by the psychologist Michael Mischel, a group of four-year old chil-
dren were offered a marshmallow, but were told that if they could wait for the
experimenter to return after some time, they could have two marshmallows (see
Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez 1989). About one third of the children grabbed
2GED is a test that US high-school dropouts are offered on a voluntary basis to high-school
dropouts. GED. It is devised to test knowledge and academic skills against those of high school
graduates. GED recipients can use their test scores to continue education or get better jobs. GED
recipients perform on average better than other high-school dropouts: they earn higher wage
and attain more education. But this is because they have on average better cognitive skills. If
one controls for cognitive abilities (as measured by test scores other than GED), they perform on
average worse in both education and professional life than non-recipients. The explanation is
that, as documented in the study, that self-selected population of GED recipients is on average
more undisciplined and less future-oriented than that of dropouts who do not take the test.
4the marshmallow right away, while some c o u l dw a i tu pt ot w e n t ym i n u t e sf o r
the researcher to return. Researchers followed the subjects for several years, and
found large differences in schooling, marriage and labor market performance.
There is also evidence that non-cognitive skills are affected signiﬁcantly by nur-
ture and family upbringing, as well as quality of schooling. Heckman (2000)
and Heckman and Krueger (2003) review the evidence from a large number of
programs targeting disadvantaged children through family development sup-
port. They show that most programs were successful in permanently raising the
treated children’s non-cognitive skills, turning them more motivated to learn,
less likely to engage in crime, and altogether more future-oriented than children
of non-treated families. On the other hand, the programs were less successful in
raising cognitive skills as measured by IQ test scores.3 The most effective pro-
grams where those targeted to children at a young age, although positive effects
are also documented for programs targeting adolescents. These studies show
how important family transmission is in this particular form of human capital
accumulation, of which the notion of patience discussed in this paper is a com-
ponent. Similar conclusions are reached by a number of studies in child develop-
ment psychology (see e.g., Goleman 1995, Shonkoff and Philips 2000 and Taylor,
McGue, and Iacono 2000). Coleman and Hoffer (1983) argue that the emphasis
on patience and self-discipline is the key of the effectiveness of Catholic schools
in the US.
If patience is accumulated and transmitted within dynasties, we should expect a
positive correlation between parents’ and the children’s propensity to save and
invest. Thisisconsistent with the evidenceprovided by KnowlesandPostlewaite
3The evidence about the effect of family upbringing on cognitive skills (as opposed to non-
cognitive skills which are the focus of our discussion in the text) and social attitudes is more
controversial and has been subject to a long-standing debate. Recent studies of behavioral ge-
neticists attribute a large share of the correlation between the cognitive skills of the parents and
those of their offspring to genetic factors. For instance, in a studies on Swedish twins McClearnet
al. (1997) estimate that 62 percent of the differences in cognitive skills is due to genetical factors
(though Feldman and Otto (1997) criticize the robustness of the results and argue that genetic
factors may actually explain no more than one third of the variation). Other studies question the
externalvalidity of these studies on twins, and arguethat culturaland environmental factors play
a predominant rolein explaining differencesacross non-homogeneous groups (seeRicherson and
Boyd (2005) for an overview). Looking at economic dimensions, Bowles and Gintis (2002) esti-
mate that about a third of the intergenerational transmission of earnings is due to genetic factors.
5(2004), who report that in the PSID parental savings behavior is an important de-
terminant of education and savings choices of their children’s households, after
controlling for standard individual characteristics. They interpret their ﬁndings
as suggestive of large differences in discount factors and of an important role
of intergenerational transmission of preferences, although they do not explicitly
model the formation and transmission of patience. Another key mechanism of
our theory is that steeper income proﬁles provide incentives for agents to in-
vest in patience. In accordance with this prediction, Carroll and Summers (1991)
document that in both Japan and the United States consumption-age proﬁles are
steeper when economic growth is high. Other studies show that consumption
grows faster for richer families, adult consumption grows faster for children of
the rich, andconsumption inequalitygrows asacohort ages(see Table1inBecker
and Mulligan (1997)).
A growing literature, both theoretical and empirical, has shown the importance
of heterogeneity in preferences, in particular in discount factors, for understand-
ing macroeconomic puzzles in modern economies. Preference heterogeneity has
been shown to be necessary to reconcile the quantitative prediction of theoretical
models with the empirical extent of wealth heterogeneity. Krusell and Smith, Jr.
(1998) show that a standard macroeconomic model with inﬁnitely lived agents,
incomplete markets, and realistic income uncertainty is unable to account for
observed wealth heterogeneity if all people have the same discount factor. If
heterogeneity in discounting is introduced, however, the model matches the em-
pirical observations. De Nardi (2004) makes a similar point in an overlapping-
generations environment. The key assumption that allows matching the wealth
distribution is that the taste for bequests increases with wealth, which in effect
gives richer people a higher discount factor. Recent empirical studies which es-
timate discount factors for different groups of the population support the view
that differences in attitudes towards accumulation (in both physical and human
capital) are correlated with differences in discount rates. For instance, Harrison,
Lau, and Williams (2002) report the results of a ﬁeld experiment conducted on
Danish households using real monetary rewards, and conclude that highly edu-
cated adults have time discount rates (which are inversely related to the discount
factor) as low as two thirds as those of less educated agents. A similar ratio is
6found between high- and low-income agents.4 In the macroeconomic models
discussed above, the heterogeneity of preferences is an exogenous feature. Our
theory is complementary to these papers, as it can provide a mechanism through
which differences in patience accumulate and persist across agents.
As mentioned above, the idea that agents can affect their own discount factor
through investments was ﬁrst introduced by Becker and Mulligan (1997), who
also discuss how factors such as wealth and life expectancy affect the incentives
to invest in patience. A recent paper by Haaparanta and Puhakka (2003) further
develops these ideas. They construct an overlapping generations model where
agents invest in their own patience, and show the possibility of multiple equi-
libria and development traps. The driving force is the complementarity between
investments in patience and investments in health that prolong the lifetime of
individuals.
In our model, in contrast, parents invest in their children’s patience. In this re-
spect, our paper is related to the growing literature on cultural transmission (e.g.,
Bisin and Verdier 2000 and 2001, Hauk and Saez-Marti 2002, Saez-Marti and
Zenou 2004).5 In this literature, parents evaluate their children’s life prospects
from the standpoint of their own preferences, and actively try to manipulate chil-
dren’s preference to induce choices that parents regard as desirable. As these
papers, we argue that economic incentives are crucial in determining the effort
parents exert in affecting their children’s preferences. However, in our model,
parents exhibit a standard type of altruism as in mainstream dynastic models:
parents make no external value judgment on their children’s choices. The in-
tertemporal transmission of patience is, like other forms of human capital, a gift
that parents pass through to their children.
The importance of cultural and religious aspects in determining which groups
4See also Gourinchas and Parker (2002)and Samwick (1998). The relationship of the empirical
literature to calibrated macro models is discussed in Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999).
A different viewpoint is expressed by Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2002) who question whether
patience is the key determinant of saving behavior, and argue the key factor to be a psychological
attitude which they call “ability to plan”. However, they admit that the difference is somewhat
hard to identify empirically.
5See Fern´ andez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2005)for empirical evidence on speciﬁc aspects of cultural
transmission.
7thrived during the Industrial Revolution is at the heart of the celebrated work of
Max Weber (1930), who emphasizes how Protestantism, and especially Calvin-
ism, promoted values that were conducive to high savings and wealth accumu-
lation. While we do not focus on religion, our approach echoes the traditional
Weberian thesis.6
Our theory provides a new perspective of the effects of inequality on develop-
ment in the face of ﬁnancial market imperfections. A number of existing theories
point out that if ﬁnancial markets are absent, poor individuals may be unable to
ﬁnance otherwise proﬁtable investment projects, and are therefore forced to en-
ter less productive professions (see Banerjee and Newman 1993 and Galor and
Zeira 1993). Matsuyama (2003) applies similar ideas to the rise and fall of class
societies. A common feature of the existing literature is that the rich (who are
least constrained by credit market imperfections) generally do best, and should
be the ﬁrst beneﬁciaries from new investment opportunities. Therefore, these
t h e o r i e sc a n n o ta c c o u n tf o rt h ef a c tt h a tt he British aristocracy, at a time when
wealth inequality was quite extreme and ﬁnancial markets shallow by modern
standards, was rapidly surpassed by middle-class entrepreneurs. In contrast, our
theory predicts that under absent ﬁnancial markets the middle class becomes the
patience class, which ultimately results in economic dominance. The two views
are complementary in the sense that lack of funds for investment, while not rel-
evant for the middle class, may help explain why the working class was largely
excluded from entrepreneurship.
Finally, our paper also relates to a series of recent papers proposing uniﬁed theo-
ries of the transition from stagnation to growth concentrated on developing joint
explanations for the evolution of output and population. Galor and Weil (2000),
Hansen and Prescott (2002), and Doepke (2004), among others, all develop mod-
els delivering an Industrial Revolution from stagnation to growth, accompanied
by a demographic transition from high to low fertility. Moreover, it relates to a
6In line with the Weberian notion that religious values affect economic behavior, Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) use the World Values Surveys to identify the relationship between
intensity of religious beliefs and economic attitudes, and ﬁnd that on average, religion is con-
ducive to higher productivity and growth. Cavalcanti, Parente, and Zhao (2003) question how-
ever that differences in preferences arising from religious afﬁliation can explain large differences
in the timing and extent of the Industrial Revolution across countries.
8recent literature that also emphasizes the role of preference formation for long-
run development, but relies on selection instead of conscious investment as the
mechanism, see Galor and Moav (2002) and Clark and Hamilton (2004). We view
the selection and investment approaches to endogenous preference formation as
complementary, because they operate on different time scales and lead to distinct
implications.
3 Occupational Choice and Time Preference
In this section, we discuss the joint determination of income proﬁles (through
the choice of an occupation) and patience. We ﬁrst describe the model, and then
characterize the solution of a dynamic individual choice problem for a dynasty.
Then, in Section 4, we extend the analysis to general equilibrium.
3.1 Preferences, Timing, and Occupations
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of altruistic agents
who live for four periods, two as children and two as adults. Every adult has one
child at the beginning of her adulthood. All agents in the economy have the same
“basic” preferences. However, a particular aspect of the preferences, namely the
time discount factor, is endogenous. In particular, an agent’s discount factor is
formed during her early childhood, and depends on the time parents decide to
spend on increasing the patience of their children.
For simplicity, we assume that agents consume and make economic decisions
only when they are adult. Adults work and consume in both adult periods. The
amount of time they spend at work is ﬁxed and identical across occupations. The
remaining time, which is normalized to unity, can be allocated to either child-
rearing l or leisure 1 − l. The motive for child rearing is to increase the patience
of the child. Agents’ preferences are represented by a time-separable utility func-
tion. The period utility (felicity) of an adult agent depends on her consumption
and leisure, which are assumed to be multiplicatively separable. More formally,
9Learn Patience Grow Up Work Work




Figure 1: The Timing of Investment in Patience
the felicity is given by:
w(c,l)=u(c) · h(1 − l),
where h(1) = 1, implying that u(c) is the felicity of an agent who does not invest
in her child’s patience. In addition to their own felicity, adults also care about the
utility of their child.
Let {c1,c 2} and {l1,l 2} denote, respectively, the consumption and time invested
in patience by an adult in the ﬁrst and second period of her life. To simplify the
analysis, we assume the investment in patience to take place in the ﬁrst period
only, i.e., l2 =0 , as depicted in the time line in Figure 1. This assumption is
motivated by the observation that children are most “formative” in their early
years, as recently emphasized by Heckman (2000).7
The lifetime utility of a young adult endowed with a discount factor given by B




utility, B (l,B) is the “production function” for patience (i.e., the discount factor
of the child as a function of the patience and time investment of the parent), and
U(B ) represents the utility of the child as a function of its discount factor. Notice
7This assumption is not essential, though: our resultsgeneralizetoaframeworkwhereparents
invest in their children’s patience over two periods, and the formation of patience occurs in both
early and late childhood.
10that discounting within the adult’s lifetime is governed by parameter B, while
discounting across generations depends on the (exogenous) parameter z.S i n c e
parents are altruistic towards their children, the choice problem can be given a
“dynastic” interpretation, where the head of the dynasty makes decisions for all
subsequent generations. 8
We assume that B (l,B) is of the form:
B
 (l,B)=( 1− ν)B + f(l), (1)
where ν ∈ (0,1] is a constant “depreciation rate” for the time discount factor, and
f is a non-negative increasing function. 9 This functional form implies that there
exists an upper bound Bmax for the discount factor, given by: Bmax = ν−1f(1).W e
also place the following restrictions on functional forms:10
Assumption 1 The function u : R+ → R is continuous, differentiable, non-negative,
strictly increasing, and weakly concave. The function h :[ 0 ,1] → R is continuous,
differentiable, non-negative, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisﬁes h(1) =
1. The function f :[ 0 ,1] → R+ is continuous, differentiable, non-negative, strictly
increasing, and weakly concave. The parameters z and ν satisfy 0 <z<1 and 0 <ν<
1.
Apart from investment in patience, the second main element of the young adult’s
decision problem is the choice of an occupation. An occupation i is characterized
8It could be argued that investments in patience also affect altruism (hence, we could have B2
where we have z). Numerical analysis suggests that this formulation would lead to qualitatively
similar results, but such change would come at a loss of analytical tractability.
9The intergenerational persistence in the discount factor captures the notion that, to some
extent, children learn by imitating parental attitudes. Thus, part of the parents’ patience is trans-
mitted effortlessly to the child.
10The only assumption that may appear to be non-standard is that all felicities are constrained
be positive. Our analysis relies on a cardinal notion of utility. If felicities were negative, it would
not be desirable for an altruistic agent to increase the ability of his offspring to savour the future.
We believe that this assumption could be relaxed by modeling patience in terms of a relative
preference for future vis-a-vis present utility. For instance, lifetime utility could be written as
(1 − ˜ B)u(c2) + ˜ Bu(c2),w h e r e ˜ B is the alternative notion of discounting. In this case, u(c) could
be negative.
11by an income proﬁle {y1,i,y 2,i}, where we assume y1,i and y2,i to be strictly posi-
tive. There is a ﬁnite number I of occupations from which to choose. We ignore
occupations featuring a dominated income proﬁle, i.e., a proﬁle such that there
exists an alternative occupation yielding higher income in one period and at least
as high an income in the other period. This is without loss of generality, as no
agent would ever choose such an occupation.
Occupations areindexedbyconsecutive non-negative integers, i.e., i ∈{ 1,2,...,I},
and ordered according to the steepness of the income proﬁle. More formally, we
assume:
Assumption 2 The income proﬁles satisfy y1,i > 0, y2,i > 0 for all i. Moreover, a higher
index denotes a steeper income proﬁle, i.e., j>iimplies:
y1,j <y 1,i and y2,j >y 2,i.
Adults jointly choose their occupation and their children’s patience, so as to max-
imize utility. We will start our analysis of the adult’s choice problem in partial
equilibrium, meaning that the income proﬁles {y1,i,y 2,i} are taken as given and
do not change over time. Later, we will extend the analysis to a general equilib-
rium economy where the income proﬁles are endogenously determined.
3.2 Outcomes with Missing Financial Markets
Aswill become clearbelow, the developmentofﬁnancial markets playsa keyrole
in our analysis. We start under the assumption that ﬁnancial markets are absent.
In other words, households cannot borrow or lend to smooth out consumption,
nor can they leave physical assets to their children. Later, we will contrast the
results to outcomes with richer ﬁnancial markets.
In this environment, consumption is equal to income in each period, c1 = y1,i
and c2 = y2,i,a n dp a t i e n c eB is the only state variable for a dynasty. The choice
problem of a young adult can be represented by the following Bellman equation:






  =( 1− ν)B + f(l). (3)
Our decision problem is therefore a dynamic programming problem with a sin-
gle state variable in the interval [0,B max], and it can be analyzed using standard
techniques. Alternatively, the choice problem can be represented in sequential
form by repeatedly substituting for v in (2). While we will mostly work with
the recursive formulation, the sequential version is sometimes useful for deriv-
ing ﬁrst-order conditions. The recursive version is written out and shown to be
equivalent to the recursive version in the mathematical appendix.
Later on, we will examine the implications of more restricted functional forms for
utility (in particular, constant relative risk aversion). Most of our results, how-
ever, hold for general functional forms.
Proposition 1 The value function v is strictly increasing and convex.
The proof for the proposition is contained in the mathematical appendix.
Intuitively, the convexity of the value function follows from two features of our
decision problem: the discount factor enters utility in a linear fashion, and there
is a complementarity between the choice of patience and the choice of income
proﬁles. To gain some intuition for the results, consider the decision problem
without an occupational choice, that is, with a ﬁxed income proﬁle {y1,y 2}.I f
we vary the discount factor B of the initial generation, while holding constant
the investment choices l of all generations, the utility of the initial generation is a
linear function of patience B. The reason is that initial utility is a linear function
of present and future discount factors, while the initial discount factor, in turn,
has a linear effect on future discount factors through the depreciation factor 1−ν.
The situation is therefore as in the dotted line in Figure 2. If the income proﬁle
is constant, it in fact turns out to be optimal to choose a constant l.T h i si sd u e ,
once again to linearity: the marginal return to investing in patience in a given
period is given by zu(y2), which does not depend on the current level of patience.
Thus, if it is optimal in our occupational choice model to hold current and future
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Figure 2: Convexity of the Value Function
In general, the optimal income proﬁle is not constant. What turns out to be opti-
mal is to choose a steep income proﬁle (large i)w h e nB is high, and a ﬂat proﬁle
when B is low. This is not unexpected, given that a high B implies that more
weight is placed on utility late in life. As we increase B, each time a steeper
proﬁle is chosen (either in the present or in the future), the value function also
becomes steeper in B.T h e o p t i m a l l increases at each step, because the cost of
providing patience declines with the steepness of the income proﬁle, while the
marginal beneﬁt increases. Since there is only a ﬁnite set of proﬁles, the value
function is piecewise linear, where the linear segments correspond to ranges of
B for which the optimally chosen present and future income proﬁles are con-
stant. In Figure 2, the true value function is therefore represented by the solid
line, where the points B, B,a n dB correspond to points where either the current
or a future income proﬁle changes. At each of the kinks, some member of the
dynasty is indifferent between (at least) two different proﬁles. Since the choice of
l depends on the chosen income proﬁles, there may be multiple optimal choices l
at a B where the value function has a kink, whereas in between kinks the optimal
choice of l is unique.
14The next propositions summarizes our results regarding the optimal choice of
income proﬁles and investment in patience.
Proposition 2 The solution to the program (2) has the following properties: (i) The
steepness of the optimal income proﬁle, y2,i/y1,i, is non-decreasing in B; (ii) The optimal
investment in patience l = l(B) is non-decreasing in B.
Proposition 3 The state space [0,B max] can be subdivided into countably many closed
intervals [B,B], such that over the interior of any range [B,B] the occupational choice
of each member of the dynasty (i.e., parent, child, grandchild and so on) is constant and
unique (though possibly different across generations), and l(B) is constant and single-
valued. The value function v(B) is piece-wise linear, where each interval [B,B] corre-
sponds to a linear segment. Each kink in the value function corresponds to a switch to an
occupation with a steeper income proﬁle by a present or future member of the dynasty. At
a kink, the optimal choices of occupation and l corresponding to both adjoining intervals
are optimal (thus, the optimal policy functions are not single-valued at a kink).
The proposition implies that the optimal policy correspondence l(B) is a non-
decreasing step-function, which takes multiple values only at a step. Proposi-
tions 2 and 3 allow us to characterize the equilibrium law of motion for patience.
Recall that we assumed that B  =( 1− ν)B + f (l). Since the policy correspon-
dence l(B) is monotone, the dynamics of B are also monotone and converge to a
steady-state from any initial condition.
Proposition 4 The law of motion of patience-capital is described by the following differ-
ence equation:
B
  =( 1− ν)B + f (l(B)),
where l(B) is a non-decreasing step-function (as described in Proposition 3). Given
an initial condition B0, the economy converges to a steady-state with constant B where
parents and children choose the same profession. Multiple steady-states are possible.
Notice that while the discount factor of a dynasty always converges, the steady-
state does not have to be unique, even for a given B0. For example, if the initial
15generation is indifferent between two different income proﬁles, the steady-state
can depend on which income proﬁle is chosen.
Up to this point, we have not made any use of differentiability assumptions.
Giventheoptimaloccupational choicesof parentsandchildren, the optimalchoice
of l must satisfy ﬁrst-order conditions, which allows us to characterize more
sharply the decisions on patience. In particular, we obtain the following ﬁrst-
order condition for l0:
u(y1,0)h







Here, the left-hand side is the marginal cost of providing patience, and the right-
hand side the marginal beneﬁt. Notice that, reﬂecting our earlier results, the
marginal cost is declining in the steepness of the ﬁrst-generations income proﬁle
(y1,0 declines when the proﬁle becomes steeper), whereas the marginal beneﬁt
increases in the steepness of all subsequent generations’ income proﬁles (y2,t in-
creases in the steepness of the proﬁles).
Since Bt always converges to a steady-state, there must be a time T such that the
occupational choice of all members of a dynasty is constant from T onwards. De-
noting the constant income proﬁle from this time onwards as {y1,y 2},t h es t e a d y -
state investment in patience ¯ l must satisfy:
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Here, the left-hand side is strictly increasing in ¯ l, and the right-hand side is
strictly increasing in u(y2)/u(y1). The equation therefore pins down ¯ l as an in-
creasing function of the steepness of the steady-state income proﬁle. The dynam-
ics of B are particularly simple once the occupational choice is constant. Since
the law of motion is given by:
Bt+1 =( 1− ν)Bt + f(¯ l),
16then, patience converges to a steady-state ¯ B given by ¯ B = f(¯ l)/ν. Substituting
back for f(¯ l), we can see that patience converges to this steady-state at a constant
rate:
Bt+1 =( 1− ν)Bt + ν ¯ B.
3.3 The Role of Missing Financial Markets
In the preceding analysis, we found that members of different professions face
different incentives for investing in patience, provided that the steepness of in-
come proﬁles differs across professions. A key assumption underlying this result
is that access to ﬁnancial markets to smooth consumption is limited. What deter-
mines the the incentive to invest in patience is not the income proﬁle per se,b u t
the lifetime proﬁle of period-by-period utilities (felicity). If, however, ﬁnancial
markets are absent, a steep income proﬁle directly translates into a steep utility
proﬁle, and thus leads to high incentives to invest.
We now want to make this point more precise by returning to the analysis of
Section 3.2, while moving to the opposite extreme in terms of assumptions on
ﬁnancial markets; namely, we allow unrestricted borrowing and lending within
each cohort at the ﬁxed return R.11 We will see that in this ﬁnancial market setup,
the choices of patience and occupation no longer interact.
In the environment with borrowing and lending, the Bellman equation describ-
ing the young adult’s decision problem is given by:
v(B)= m a x
i∈I,0≤l≤1,s




  =( 1− ν)B + f(l). (8)
The next proposition establishes that the introduction of a perfect market for bor-
rowing and lending removes any link between patience and occupational choice.
11The possibility of wealth transmission across generations is discussed in Section 5.1
17Proposition 5 The value function v deﬁned in (7) is increasing and convex. The only
income proﬁles that are chosen in equilibrium are those that maximize the present value
of income, y1,i + y2,i/R. The set of optimal income proﬁles is independent of patience B.
The choice of occupation does not affect the investment in patience.
The intuition for this result is simple: with perfect borrowing and lending, ev-
ery adult will choose the income proﬁle that yields the highest present value of
income, regardless of patience. The proposition shows that at least some degree
of ﬁnancial market imperfection is necessary for occupational choice and invest-
ments in patience to be interlinked. It is not necessary, however, to assume the
entire absence of ﬁnancial markets, as we did in the preceding section for analyt-
ical convenience. As long asthe steepness of an income proﬁle is at least partially
transmitted to consumption proﬁles, the basic mechanism is at work.
A positive implication of this ﬁnding is that the degree of discount factor hetero-
geneity in a population depends on the development of ﬁnancial markets. In an
economy where ﬁnancial markets are mostly absent, incentives to invest in pa-
tience vary widely across members of different professions, and consequently we
would expect to observe a large corresponding variation in actual acquired pref-
erences. In modern times with richer ﬁnancial markets, these differences should
be smaller. For example, while engaging in a lengthy program of study (such
as medical school) which leads to high future incomes may still require a certain
degree of patience and perseverence, today’s students have access to educational
loans and credit cards. Hence, the modern-day artisans are able to consume some
of their future rewards already in the present, and consequently they and their
parents face a smaller incentive to invest in specialized preferences.
4 General Equilibrium with Two Technologies
The results up to this point demonstrate that there exists a basic complementarity
between the acts of investing in patience and choosing a profession. Dynasties
starting out patient choose professions that are characterized by a steep income
proﬁle which, in turn, increases further the incentive to invest in patience. The
18self-reinforcing nature of the two aspects of our decision problem suggests the
possibility that different dynasties may diverge and end up in different steady-
states. However, multiple steady-states are not a necessary feature of our model.
What the preceding section does show is that if different dynasties choose sepa-
rate professions with different income proﬁles, they will also end up with differ-
ent levels of patience. Whether different dynasties choose different professions
depends both on the level and the steepness of possible income proﬁles. There-
fore, if we wish to determine whether dynasties diverge or converge, we must
move beyond partial equilibrium and endogenize the incomes derived in differ-
ent professions.
The point of this section is to show that general equilibrium forces can adjust the
returns to working in different professions such that at least some agents ﬁnd it
optimal to work in each profession. Given the different choices of profession in
the population, divergence in patience then necessarily follows. Outcomes of this
type naturally occur if the reward to being in a profession isa decreasing function
of the number of members of the profession, i.e., if there are decreasing returns.
While this result could be derived in many different economic environments, we
establish this point within a speciﬁc environment geared towards our application
to the demise of the aristocracy.
4.1 Analytical Results
We assume that there are three occupations, with occupational mobility across
only two of them. We parameterize preferences over consumption by a utility
function featuring constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), i.e., u(c)=cσ,w h e r e
0 <σ≤ 1.12 Finally, we concentrate on equilibria starting from an initial condi-
tion where patience is identical across agents. Apart from simplifying the analy-
sis, this focus is coherent with our aim of showing that preference stratiﬁcation
necessarily arises through the process of sorting of the population into different
occupations, even if everybody is initially identical.
12Allowing case σ ≤ 0 would violate our assumption of the period utility function being non-
negative. While the results can in principle extended to richer utility functions, we focus on the
case covered by Assumption 1.
19We name occupations and technologies in a way hinting at the application that
will be discussed later in the paper. The two modes of production are called
agriculture and artisanry. For simplicity, we assume agricultural output, YM, and
the production of artisans, YM, to be perfect substitutes, Y = YA + YM. The two
technologies differ in terms of the inputs used. The agricultural technology uses





where α ∈ (0,1). The artisan technology is linear in skilled labor:
YM = qH. (10)
The total amount of land is ﬁxed at Z =1 . Land is not traded and is owned by
a ﬁxed number of dynasties, where each landowner bequeaths the land he owns
to his child when he passes away. Land is only productive if the owner monitors
production; therefore, landownersdonot supplyskilled orunskilled labor along-
side using their land. Thus, landowning is just another profession characterized
by a lifetime proﬁle of rental income. There is, however, nooccupational mobility
between landowners and the other classes. Since the supply of land is ﬁxed, the
decisions of landowners (on investing in patience) have no general-equilibrium
implications. We will therefore concentrate on the “lower classes” for now.
The main difference between skilled and unskilled labor is the lifetime labor sup-
ply proﬁle. An unskilled worker supplies one unit of agricultural labor in each
adult period. For skilled workers, in contrast, the ﬁrst adult period is partially
used for acquiring skills and experience. Effective labor supply is therefore one
unit in the ﬁrst adult period, and γ>1 units in the second adult period. In ev-
ery period the mass of labor-market participants is equal to one (the total mass
of land-less agents is two, but only half of them are adults). Labor markets are
assumed to be competitive.
Deﬁne, next, an equilibrium with constant wages across dynasties. We focus
on constant-wage equilibria because in this case the analysis of the preceding
section (which was for a decision problem with a ﬁxed set of occupational in-
20come proﬁles) directly applies to the decision problem of agents in our general-
equilibrium economy. Since the marginal product of each type of labor is a func-
tion of labor supply, a constant-wage equilibrium is characterized by a constant
number of each type of worker over time.
Deﬁnition 1 An Equilibrium with Constant Wages (ECW) is a time invariant distri-
bution of wages per effective unit of labor and a time-invariant distribution of land-less
adults between the two occupational choices, such that (a) all working members of the
land-less dynasties optimally choose their occupation, (b) all parents optimally choose the
investment in patience, and (c) all markets clear.
In an ECW, the income proﬁle of agricultural workers is ﬂat. Landowners receive
the same amount of rent every period, and therefore have a ﬂat income proﬁle,
just like the workers. In contrast, artisans have an increasing earning proﬁle and,
hence, they have a stronger incentive to invest in patience. Given the CRRA pref-
erence speciﬁcation, only the steepness, but not the level of income matters for
the investments in patience. The following proposition follows from the deﬁni-
tion of ECW and from the analysis of Section 3.
Proposition 6 An ECW is characterized by occupational segregation, i.e., parents and
their children choose the same profession. Under CRRA preferences, the distribution of
discount factors converges to a steady-state where all worker and landowner dynasties
have a discount factor ¯ BA, whereas artisans have a discount factor ¯ BM > ¯ BA.
The proposition establishes that if an ECW exists and the number of workers and
artisans is strictly positive, we indeed observe diverging patience in the popu-
lation, with each group converging to a profession-speciﬁc discount factor. We
still need to establish whether such an ECW actually exists. Since an ECW is a
particular type of equilibrium, its existence depends on the initial conditions. We
will now show that a unique ECW exists if all dynasties start out with the same
initial patience ˜ B,p r o v i d e dt h a t ¯ BA ≤ ˜ B ≤ ¯ BM. This encompasses the case of
an economy where, before time zero, only the agricultural activity was pursued
(e.g., because q was very low), and investment in patience had settled down to
21the level ˜ B = ¯ BA. Then, at time zero, q unexpectedly increases, and occupational
sorting starts.
In an ECW, employment and productivity per efﬁciency unit of labor is constant
in each sector. In particular, if we denote by µ ∈ [0,1] the proportion of land-
less adults employed in agriculture, the competitive wages per efﬁciency units
of labor in artisanry and agriculture are, respectively, wM = q and wA = αµα−1.
Thus, an artisan earns, respectively, q and γq in the ﬁrst and second period of
his life, whereas an unskilled worker earns a ﬂat wage of αµα−1. Notice that the
deﬁnition of ECW does not require the age distribution of the adults employed
in each profession to be time-invariant. For instance, a ECW is consistent with a
larger numberof young adults choosing artisanry in even than in odd periods (or
vice versa), as long as the total number of workers engaged in each occupation is
time-invariant.13 Establishing the existence of an ECW now amounts to showing
that there exists an µ ∈ [0,1], such that all conditions of Deﬁnition 1 are satisﬁed.
The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 7 Suppose that the economy starts out with everyone having the same dis-
count factor ˜ B,w h e r e ¯ BA ≤ ˜ B ≤ ¯ BM. Then, there exists a unique ECW such that:
• either µ =1 , wA = α, and all land-less adults in all periods weakly prefer to work
in agriculture,
• or µ<1, wA = αµα−1,w M = q,a n dµ is such that the initial generation of adults
is indifferent between agricultural labor and artisanry, and all children weakly
prefer their parents’ profession.
Which of the two possible outcomes is obtained is a function of the productiv-
ity of artisanry q. If this productivity is sufﬁciently high, there will be a positive
number of artisans in equilibrium, and preferences will diverge across profes-
sions.
13This implies ﬂuctuations in the aggregate manufacturing output, whereas agricultural pro-
duction remains constant, since young and old adults are equally productive.
224.2 A Medieval Economy
In this section, we illustrate the general-equilibrium results with outcomes in a
parameterized version of our economy. The economy is populated by measure
one of land-less adults, who are either agricultural workers or artisans, and mea-
sure a of landowners, each of whom owns an equal share of the one unit of land.
The functional form for the accumulation of patience is given by:
f(l)=φ

1 − (1 − l)
ξ
,
where we require φ>0 and ξ>1 to meet the restrictions in Assumption 1. The
functional form was chosen because it implies that the marginal productivity of
investing in patience converges to zero as the time investment l approaches one.
Whilethis property isnot required for any ofour results, it isuseful to ensure that
thesolution for l isinterior. Theproduction technologiesare givenby(9)and(10).
The period utility functions are u(c)=cσ for consumption (as mentioned before)
and:
h(1 − l)=( 1− l)
η
for leisure, where we require 0 <η<1 to satisfy Assumption 1. Table 1 sum-
marizes our choices for all parameter values. The number of landowners a is left
unspeciﬁed, because it only sets the income level that each landowner receives,


















Table 1: Parameter Values for Medieval Economy
In a constant-wage equilibrium, agricultural workers and landowners face a ﬂat
income proﬁle, while given our choice of γ =2artisans have twice the income
when old compared to when young. We can use the ﬁrst-order condition (6) to
compute the steady-state patience for each profession. Given our functional form
23assumptions, the condition is given by:
η
φξ(1 − ¯ l)ξ−η =
z






Solving this equation for ¯ l and plugging in all parameter values, we obtain so-
lutions of ¯ lW =0 .18 for agricultural workers and landowners and ¯ lA =0 .46 for
artisans. In steady-state, patience is given by ¯ B = f(¯ l)/ν, so that these invest-
ments translate into long-run discount factors of ¯ BW =0 .32 and ¯ BA =0 .75.I f
we interpret the length of a period to be ten years, these numbers correspond to
annual discount rates of 0.89 and 0.97, respectively.
We now proceed to compute a constant-wage equilibrium from an initial condi-
tion where everybody is equally patient. In particular, we assume all dynasties to
start out with patience B =0 .5, right in the middle between the two steady-states
for workers and artisans. Such an initial condition could be justiﬁed if initially
both agricultural and artisan tasks were carried out by each dynasty, resulting in
an income proﬁle of intermediate steepness. The initial condition captures the
transition of such an economy from a point where a strict division of labor is
introduced. Proposition 7 guarantees that a unique constant-wage equilibrium
exists. In the equilibrium, about 55 percent of the land-less adults are agricul-
tural workers. The income of an artisan is q =0 .5 in the ﬁrst period and γq =1
in the second period, while an agricultural worker receives a wage of wW =0 .67
in each period. Notice that workers have a lower average income than artisans;
they still prefer to be workers because they value the ﬂat income proﬁle.
Figure 3 shows the value function (top panel) and the law of motion for patience
(bottom panel) for members of the land-less class in our economy. As shown in
Section 3.2, the value function is piecewise-linear and convex, with the kink at
B =0 .5 corresponding to the threshold above which adults choose to be artisans,
and below which they become agricultural workers. That the kink is at the initial
patience of B =0 .5 is, of course, no accident: in the initial period, the number of
workers and artisans and, therefore, wages adjust such that each member of the
initial generation is just indifferent between being a worker and an artisan. The
law of motion for patience jumps at the threshold of B =0 .5, which is in line with







































Figure 3: Value Function and Law of Motion for Patience for Lower Classes
Proposition 3 . In equilibrium, there is persistence in the occupational choice: the
children of ﬁrst-generation artisans become artisans, while the children of work-
ers become workers. Notice that from the second generation forward, patience
diverges from the threshold B =0 .5. Hence, only the initial generation is in-
different between being a worker or an artisan; the ﬁrst generation’s children
strictly prefer their parent’s occupation to the alternative. As shown in Propo-
sition 4, the law of motion is linear subject to being in a dynasty with a given
occupation. Consequently, patience approaches its steady-state of BW or BA at a
constant rate, as displayed in Figure 4.
The landowners face the same incentives for investing in patience as the agricul-
tural workers. Since they do not face an occupational choice, their law of motion
for patience (not shown) is linear. In particular, it is identical to the workers’
law of motion up to the threshold B =0 .5, and is given by the linear extension
of the worker’s law of motion above the threshold. Over time, the landowners’
patience evolves just like the workers’ patience in Figure 4.
Thus, in our two-technology medieval economy preferences diverge across pro-





















Figure 4: Patience Over Time
fessions from the second generation onward, despite the fact that initially every-
one has the same preferences. We end up with a society stratiﬁed along occupa-
tional lines. As our preceding analysis shows, this stratiﬁcation is a quite general
outcome, provided that income proﬁles differ across occupations, and ﬁnancial
markets do not allow perfect consumption smoothing.
In the medieval economy, class differences are only important to the extent that
they determine the professional choice of individuals. Patience becomes of cen-
tral importance, however, when technological change gives rise to new invest-
ment opportunities (the “Industrial Revolution”). In the following section, we
examine the fate of the different classes in our economy after the arrival of a new
“capitalist” technology.
265 Capitalism and the Decline of the Aristocracy
Much of modern macroeconomics is built around a basic workhorse model: the
neoclassical growth model with optimizing consumers. In this model, agents
face a single intertemporal decision, namely, an investment choice. It is well-
known that in this type of model small differences in time preferences across
agents have a large impact on wealth accumulation. In particular, if preferences
are CRRA and there are different groups which are only distinguished by their
time preference, the most patient group ultimately owns all the wealth.
In the theory built in the preceding sections, societies become stratiﬁed along
occupational lines, where the different classes are distinguished by their time
preference. Up to this point, however, there was no possibility of capital accu-
mulation. In this section, we explore what happens if an investment opportunity
exists. In particular, we focus on a version of the “Industrial Revolution”, in
which the investment opportunity is unexpectedly introduced in a medieval so-
ciety where the classes have already acquired different levels of patience. The
result will be unsurprising in the light of standard macroeconomic theory: the
patient classes, i.e., the artisan middle classes, are in the best position to take ad-
vantage of the new opportunity since they possess the “spirit of capitalism.” The
artisans therefore leapfrog over the declining landed elite, and achieve economic
dominance.
5.1 The General Model with Wealth Accumulation
Consider the choice problem of a dynasty that can accumulate two assets: phys-
ical capital and patience. The rate of return to capital is constant and equal to
A. Capital is assumed to depreciate at the rate δ. Young adults inherit capital
from their parents, and decide how much of their ﬁrst-period income they con-
sume and how much they invest. Investments in physical capital are assumed
to be irreversible: agents can consume the return to physical capital (as well as
their labor income), but the capital stock cannot be liquidated and turned into
consumption. Thus, we interpret our model of capital accumulation as invest-
27ment in a family-run entrepreneurial activity. The capital owned by an old agent
is bequeathed—up to depreciation—to his child.14 We continue to assume that,
because of capital market imperfections, agents cannot borrow.
More formally, let K ≥ 0 denote the bequest of capital received by a young adult.
The sequence of budget constraints facing this agent is given by:
c1 + K
  =( 1 − δ + A)K + y1i, (11)
c2 = AK
  + y2i, (12)
subject to
K
  ≥ (1 − δ)K. (13)
Consider the budget constraint in the ﬁrst adult period, (11). The total income
consists of labor income, y1i, plus capital income, (1−δ+A)K. The latter, in turn,
consists of the stock of capital remaining after depreciation ((1 − δ)K), and the
return to the productive activity (AK). However, because of the irreversibility
constraint, (13), he cannot liquidate and consume the stock (namely, c1 ≤ AK +
y1i). In the second period, (12), the agent earns the labor income y1i and the return
to capital, AK . Since the capital stock cannot be liquidated, the agent bequeaths
the capital stock, K   =( 1− δ)K , to his child. 15
We maintain our earlier assumption that utility is CRRA in consumption. The
recursive representation of the problem of a young adult endowed with the dis-
count factor B andthe capital stock K is therefore given by the following Bellman
14Dynastic enterpriseswereverycommonintheearlydaysoftheIndustrialRevolution. Caselli
and Gennaioli (2003)discuss this phenomenon, and argue that it is due to the underdevelopment
of ﬁnancial market that makes it unproﬁtable for parents to liquidate their business instead of
leaving it to the children. In our model, the irreversibility constraint implies that differences
in investments across families cause differences in initial assets for the next generation. Similar
results could be obtained under reversible investment if the altruism parameter z (the intergener-
ational discount factor) were an increasing function of patience B (the intragenerational discount
factor).
15Note that, in principle, parents could bequeath additional resources to their offspring. How-
ever, we focus on economies where the irreversibility of the capital stock is a binding constraint
for the old adults. Namely, in the last period of their lives agents would like to liquidate part
of the capital stock and consume it, but they are instead forced to leave it to their children as an
involuntary bequest. Clearly, in such economies, agents do not leave any additional bequests.
Formally, this outcome can be guaranteed to be optimal by choosing the altruism factor z appro-
priately.
28equation:
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subject to (3), (11), (12), (13), c1 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ l ≤ 1.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to provide an analytical characterization of this
program. We will then proceed in two steps. First, we study the case in which
there is no occupational choice and no labor income. In this case, some insightful
characterization can be attained. Then, we move to the medieval economy of
section 4.2 where agents choose between two occupations. This case, which can
only be analyzed numerically, provides an interpretation to the decline of the
aristocracy and the triumph of the bourgeouisie during the industrial revolution.
5.2 Analytical Results
Suppose that y1i = y2i =0 . The adult’s decision problem of investing in patience
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subject to(3), (13)andK  ≤ (1−δ+A)K,an d0 ≤ l ≤ 1. Thefollowing proposition
sums up the basic characterization of this decision problem.
Proposition 8 Suppose that returns are sufﬁciently low to guarantee bounded utility,
i.e., z[(1−δ)(1−δ+A)]σ < 1. Then the functional equation deﬁned by (15) has a unique
ﬁxed point v, which is a solution of the corresponding sequence problem. Let k ≡ K /K.
The value function can be expressed as v(B,K)=KσV (B),w h e r e
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29is increasing and convex in B. The optimal policy functions l(B) and k (B) are contin-
uous and non-decreasing.
This proposition has the important consequence that from any initial condition,
patience B and the growth rate of capital K /K necessarily converge to a steady-
state. Moreover, both variables depend on patience B only. The existing capital
stock K only enters as a scale parameter, due to the fact that utility is CRRA in
consumption and the investment technology is linear. We also ﬁnd a version of
the complementarity result of the occupational choice model: a high level of pa-
tience leads to higher investment, and therefore a steeper lifetime utility proﬁle.
Both unique and multiple steady-states are possible, depending on parameters.
Theforce favoring multiplesteady-states isthe self-reinforcing mechanismwhich
links savings and investment in patience. A patient person (high B)t e n d st o
choose a high investment rate. High investment, in turn, induces a steep con-
sumption proﬁle, and this in turn provides an incentive for altruistic parents to
invest in patience.16 The forces opposed to multiple steady-states are the desire to
smooth consumption and decreasing returns to investing in patience. When an
agent has a strong preference for a smooth consumption proﬁle, the complemen-
tarity between savings and patience can be overcome, and the standard forces
leading to a unique steady-state prevail.
Note, ﬁnally, that there are important similarities between the choice of investing
in a family ﬁrm and our original choice problem of choosing an occupation. In
our framework, choosing an occupation amounts to choosing a lifetime income
proﬁle. Choosing a level of investment achieves the same purpose, by trading
off a reduction in present consumptionw i t haf u t u r eg a i n .A sw eh a v es e e n ,t h e
same complementarities that characterized the joint decision problem on occu-
pation and patience reappear in the analysis of this section. Nevertheless, there
is an important difference. The choice of an occupation has no direct effect on
16With capital accumulation, not only the lifetimei n c o m ep r o ﬁ l eo fag i v e nc o h o r t ,b u ta l s ot h e
income proﬁle across generations is endogenous. If investment is high, the next generation starts
out with more capital then the current generation. This shifts future utilities upward relative to
currentutility. Since the cost of investing in patience is in terms of currentutility, while the beneﬁt
is proportional to future utilities, this effect increases the complementarity between savings and
patience.
30the children (other than the indirect one through patience), whereas investing in-
creases the beginning-of-life assets of the offspring. Differences previously only
manifesting themselves in occupational choices and preferences have now an ef-
fect on the growth rate of assets within dynasties.
5.3 The Decline of the Aristocracy
In this section, we introduce the capitalist technology into the parameterized
medieval economy that was discussed in Section 4.2, thereby combining occu-
pational choice and investment into a common framework. While general ana-
lytical results cannot be found for this combined model, we provide numerical
results to show that its implications are just what the preceding analysis would
lead us to expect. In particular, when we start the economy in the medieval
steady-state where the society is stratiﬁed in terms of preferences, we ﬁnd that
only the artisans make use of the new technological opportunity. The result is
the economic triumph of the most patient social class, i.e., the urban bourgeoisie,
over the original landed elite.
The recursive representation of the problem of a young adult endowed with the
discount factor B and capital stock K, and choosing between an agricultural and
an artisan technology, is given by:
v(B,K)= m a x
i∈{A,M},l,K
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subject to (3), (1−δ)K ≤ K  ≤ y1i +(1−δ +A)K,a n d0 ≤ l ≤ 1. The agricultural
and artisan technology continue to exist alongside the capitalist technology, and
are speciﬁed as in Section 4.2. Notice that adults can, and will, continue to work
in one of the existing professions even while they are investing in the new tech-
nology. This assumption is for realism; in particular, we want to allow aristocrats
to earn rents from their land and invest the proceeds in a capital market, so as
to not exclude them from investment from the outset. The landowners face the




































Figure 5: The Policy Function for Capital Investment
the occupational choice component: landowners derive income y1 and y2 from
renting out their land, and do not choose any of the other two professions.
The economy is parameterized as in Section 4.2 (see Table 1, and each class starts
out with its steady-state discount factor (BW for workers and landowners and BA
for artisans). Even though the additional income source implies that the choice
problem described by equation (17) is not equivalent to the capital-only model
analyzed in Section 5.1, the implications for the interaction between capital accu-
mulation and patience are quite similar. Figure 5 shows (for the landless classes)
the policy function for the decision on investment (the child’s capital on the ver-
tical axis) as a function of the adult’s patience and inherited capital stock. The
assumed depreciation rate is δ =0 .2, and the return on the investment tech-
nology is A =0 .6. The conspicuous feature of Figure 5 is a “cliff.” If we hold
the inherited capital stock K constant and increase patience B, the irreversibility
constraint initially binds for the young adult, so that they do not invest and only
carry forward the depreciated capital to the next period. Once a critical level of
patience has been reached, however, the invested capital stock increases quite
































Figure 6: Patience and Capital Over Time
rapidly, until a plateau is reached where savings increase slowly with patience.
The reason for this behavior of the policy function is the complementarity be-
tween savings and patience. The low plateau for low patience corresponds to
savings decisions implying that wealth declines from the current generation to
the next. Consequently, current utility is high relative to future utility. The high
plateau depicts savings choices that imply an increasing proﬁle of wealth from
the current to the next generation. Parents therefore enjoy a lower level of util-
ity than their children, which makes investing in the children’s patience highly
attractive. The face of the cliff is precisely the region where the children’s wealth
rises above the parents’ wealth, which ampliﬁes the effect of rising patience in
investment in patience.
Apart from investment in physical capital, our original decisions of choosing an
occupation and investing in patience are still present in the model. Aspreviously,
for any level of capital there is a critical level of patience B above which an agent
chooses to be an artisan. This critical level is hardly affected by the possibility
of investment and is still around B =0 .5. The dynamics for patience are also
33close to unchanged for low levels of patience up to about B =0 .6.F o rh i g h e rp a -
tience, however, the complementarity with physical investment comes into play,
leading to high investment in patience for investors. The overall dynamics are
divergent: dynasties starting out with low patience stay workers forever, and
their patience approaches the medieval worker steady-state BW. Dynasties that
start out sufﬁciently patient ﬁrst become artisans, and ultimately also invest. The
wealth of the dynasty is increasing over time, and patience approaches a new,
higher steady-state.
Figure 6 displays the dynamics of patience and capital for a worker and artisan
dynasty starting out with zero capital and the medieval steady-state levels of
patience, BW and BA. For the worker, nothing changes: the dynasty does not
invest, and patience remains at the steady-state. The artisan dynasty, however, is
sufﬁciently patient to ﬁnd investment in capital attractive right away. Investment
in capital increases the incentive for investing in patience, so that both patience
and the growth rate of capital increase during a few periods, approaching a new
balanced growth path.17
The landowners behave just like the workers. They have the same ﬂat income
proﬁle (although possibly a higher income level) and the same low patience. At
the return offered by the new technology, the landowners would actually want
to borrow, but they cannot due to the borrowing constraint. The landowners
therefore continue to live of their land rents, and are soon overtaken by the rising
class of capitalists as the economically dominant group in society.
As the discussion in the preceding section should have made clear, some of the
qualitative features of the case presented are not fully general. For example, the
return to capital is, for obvious reasons, a key parameter: for very low returns,
not even the artisans would want to use the new technology, and for extremely
high returns even the workers and landowners would turn into capitalists. Like-
wise, we would not expect to observe a continuing divergence between the capi-
talists and the other classes if agents were highly risk averse, and the production
17Notice that the level of patience exceeds one after a few periods; this does not cause any
problems in our overlapping generations economy, since the intergenerational discount factor is
still ﬁxed at z.
34function for patience highly inelastic. However, despite these caveats, it is a gen-
eral conclusion that the most patient groups will be the ﬁrst to make use of a new
investment opportunity. Thus, even if the environment were such that ultimately
even landowners invest, we would still expect the patient middle class to get a
head start, and possibly overtake the landowning class in the process.
Thus, we believe that our theory can offer a plausible explanation for the failure
of the landed aristocracy in Britain to beneﬁt from the Industrial Revolution. To
examine this hypothesis in more detail, we now turn to the historical circum-
stances that accompanied the decline of the British aristocracy.
6 The Historical Context
The thesis of this paper is that the failure of the aristocracy to take a more active
role in the Industrial Revolution stemmed from a form of “cultural inappropri-
ateness” which, in turn, had its roots in centuries of reliance on relatively ﬂat
and safe rents, which gave little incentives to parents to educate their children
in terms of patience and frugality. While our focus on class-speciﬁc preferences
may appear unusual from the standpoint of modern economic theory, this argu-
ment is very much in line with the perception of many contemporary observers.
There are countless examples, both in scientiﬁc and ﬁctional writing, of portray-
als of members of the landowning class as inherently different from other peo-
ple, and ill-disposed for commercial activity. To mention just one writer, Adam
Smith (1776) describes the cultural attitudes of a landed aristocrat in the follow-
ing words:
The situation of such a person naturally disposes him to attend rather to
ornament which pleases his fancy, than to proﬁt for which he has so little oc-
casion. The elegance of his dress, of his equipage, of his house, and household
furniture, are objects which from his infancy he has been accustomed to have
some anxiety about. (p. 410)
Landowners were not only preoccupied with conspicuous consumption, leaving
them little time to consider proﬁtable investment opportunities, but (according
35to Smith) did not consider money as something to be proﬁtably invested to begin
with:
A merchant is accustomed to employ his money chieﬂy in proﬁtable projects;
whereas a mere country gentleman is accustomed to employ it chieﬂy in ex-
pense. The one often sees his money go from him and return to him again
with a proﬁt: the other, when once he parts with it, very seldom expects to
see any more of it. (p. 432)
Smith, as well as many other classical economists and contemporary observers,
found it entirely natural to think of members of different classes as essentially
distinct beings whose behavior was governed by class-speciﬁc rules. In modern
economic analysis, preferences are usually assumed to be ﬁxed, and no system-
atic variation in tastes across different groups of people is allowed for. This view
would lead one to believe that Smith and his contemporaries were simply wrong
about the peculiar tastes and preferences of the aristocracy. In contrast, we hy-
pothesize that the contemporary view was correct. We do not take the differences
in class-speciﬁc preferences as exogenously given, however, but provide an eco-
nomic rationale that explains how the preferences of the aristocracy and the other
classes diverged in the ﬁrst place. To assess the plausibility of our hypothesis, we
now turn tohistorical evidenceregarding the mainassumptionsand implications
of our theory. We start by discussing evidence on the driving force behind our
mechanism, namely, difference in class-speciﬁc income proﬁles.
6.1 Income Proﬁles Before the Industrial Revolution
Westart bytaking a closer look atthe life of pre-industrial artisans and craftsmen,
i.e., the classes that, according to our theory, developed a high degree of patience
as a consequence of the steep income proﬁles they faced over their lifetime. Pre-
industrial artisans were, on average, a middle class, poorer than the aristocrats,
merchants and bankers, but richer than unskilled workers. Their lives were very
uneven: a hard youth was compensated by the hope for prosperity in later age.
In most of Europe, an artisan’s career was regulated by the statutes of local guilds
36and consisted of three periods: apprenticeship, journeymanship, and mastership.
The life of an apprentice was not glamorous. “Upon payment of a placement
fee, apprentices took their place in their master’s household, agreeing to obey
and respect him as a father [...] Not all apprentices reached mastership, but
this does not gainsay the fact that the purpose of apprenticeship was selection
andthegoaladirectroutetomastership[...]”(Farr2000, p. 33). The length of
the apprenticeship period varied over time, locations and professions. It would
typically be 5–6 years, but in some professions one would remain an apprentice
for up to 12 years (Epstein 1991).
After apprenticeship, artisans would become journeymen, and travel around
European cities, serving as employees at some master’s shop. This wandering
period was usually compulsory, and would last for a minimum of 3–4 years
(Friedrichs 1995). Frugality wasessential for journeymen whohoped to become a
master one day. “Unless he was able to count on substantial inheritance or fortu-
nate marriage, a journeyman’s primary interest was to amass capital for opening
their shop or business” (Epstein 1991, p. 115). Having completed these wander-
years, the journeyman could apply for admission to mastership, which was in
itself a very expensive process.18 Only at that point, if successful, could the jour-
neyman become a master and a new guild member, and was free to open a shop
at his own expense. Not all journeymen managed their life to this happy conclu-
sion, and many remained journeymen forever.
These accounts already show that the life of an artisan was highly investment-
intensive. More direct evidence of the steepness of their consumption proﬁle
can be inferred from data on wage differences between journeymen and masters.
Unfortunately, the availability of these data is limited to the complexity of con-
tracts and the fact that journeymen were often paid piece-rate (nor do tax rolls
help much, since they fail to report whether the taxpaying artisan was a jour-
neyman).19 Perhaps more informative are the data on wealth inequality. These
18The applicants owed the payment of a series of application fees, the completion of a master-
piece according to the regulation of each guild and the outlay (if the masterpiece was accepted)
of a luxurious banquet for the masters he hoped to join. In addition, he had to submit the name
of a proposed bride, which the guild was supposed to examine and approve.
19The only exceptions of which we are aware are the studies of Phelps Brown and Hopkins
(1957) and Munro (2004). Based on the same dataset on builders wages in Southern England
37suggest that both earnings and consumption inequality over the life-cycle were,
on average, quite large. Farr (2000) shows that in the seventeenth century, the av-
erage dowry that daughters of master artisans of Dijon brought to their marriage
was three times as large as that of daughters of journeymen. Approximately the
same ratio is documented to exist over a century later in a study on Lyon. Twice
as large differences are found in the value of houses owned by masters and jour-
neymen: a ratio of about 6:1 is evident in Delft between 1620 and 1644. In sum-
mary, the most conservative estimates point at a master-journeyman wealth ratio
of 3:1.
In contrast, the wage proﬁle of agricultural workers was relatively ﬂat. Figure 7
describes the age-earning proﬁle of a farm laborer in England in the early nine-
teenth century, based on the estimates of Burnette (2002). As shown by the ﬁgure,
the proﬁle is essentially ﬂat between age 20 and 60. Consistent with our theory,
this suggests that appreciation of the future was less valuable for rural workers
than for urban ones.
As far as the aristocracy and landed gentry is concerned, the available evidence
suggests that their income and consumption proﬁles were fairly ﬂat as well.
Members of this class derived their income mostly from owning land and, to
a smaller extent, from mining projects (see Beckett 1986). Annual variation in in-
come can therefore be linked to two dominant sources: ﬂuctuation in land rental
rates, and changes in the size of the estate through land sales or purchases. While
there were always some families who managed there estates particularly suc-
cessfully and were able to increase the size of their holdings, most aristocrats
contented themselves with preserving the estate, ultimately passing to the next
generation just as much as they once inherited. In periods of rising land rental
rates, the income of the aristocracy as a class would be increasing as well; but
given that rents tended to change only slowly over time, these movements would
not generate the steep lifetime income proﬁles that were typical for artisans and
craftsmen.
and the Southern Low Countries between 1346–1500, they report that in Bruges, the craftsmens’
journeymen earnedhalf of the master’s wage, while the English journeymen earnedtwo-thirds of
their masters’ wage. It is difﬁcult to generalize these differences to other professions. In most of
them, the relationship between shopowning masters and their employees was more hierarchical,
so it is reasonable to guess that the wage differences were larger than in the construction sector.



































Figure 7: Estimated Earnings Proﬁle for Farm Laborers in England, 1830–1840
Taken by itself, the fact that the overall income of a given family was fairly con-
stant over time does not imply that consumption proﬁles were ﬂat as well. In
particular, steep lifetime consumption proﬁles would arise if aristocracts started
to consume heavily only after inheriting their estates, while living frugally dur-
ing their younger years. However, the available evidence suggests that, if any-
thing, the opposite was true. Young aristocrats typically did not work during
their childhood and young adulthood. During this period of their lives, sons
and daughters were supported by their parents. These family support payments
tended to be quite large, and played a large role in aristocratic indebtedness:
“family payments were not the only cause of aristocratic indebtedness, but con-
temporaries usually regard them as playing a crucial role” (Beckett 1986, p. 298).
Thus, aristocrats usually lived in some comfort during their entire lives, and did
not experience the stark contrast of a sober adolescence with relative prosperity
during adulthood on that was so typical for urban artisans and craftsmen.
Our theory also relies on the possibility for agents to choose between different oc-
39cupations, especially urban versus rural activities. Clearly, in the pre-industrial
world there were some barriers to geographical mobility. Nevertheless, mobility
from countryside to cities and between cities was quite substantial. Large mi-
gratory ﬂows are implied by the observation that, after the Black Death, the size
of the urban population expanded dramatically, in spite of high mortality and
low fertility that would have placed cities, absent migration, below the natural
reproduction rate. A large inﬂow of people was necessary to maintain the demo-
graphic balance as “in spite of their vitality in the economic, politic, artistic, and
cultural spheres, from a purely biological point of view the cities of pre-industrial
Europe were large graveyards” (Cipolla 1994, p.134).
6.2 Who Were the New Industrialists?
It has long been part of the conventionalw i s d o mo nt h eI n d u s t r i a lR e v o l u t i o n
that the majority of the entrepreneurs who came in to riches at the beginning
of the nineteenth century were frugal individuals from the middle and lower
classes: “The early industrialists were for the most part men who had their ori-
gin in the same social strata from which their workers came. They lived very
modestly, spent only a fraction of their earnings for their households and put the
rest back into the business” (von Mises 1963, p.622).
More recent studies suggest that vo Mises may exaggerate the role of self-made
men coming from the lower classes. In a study of founders of large industrial
undertakings in Britain between 1750 and 1850, Crouzet (1985) concludes that
“neither the upper class nor the lower orders made a a large contribution to
the recruitment of industrialists [...] Indeed, the retreat by landowners from
involvement in industry, which had started in the seventeenth century, became
more and more pronounced as the eighteenth century progressed” (p.68). The
only class that was signiﬁcantly over-represented among the industrialists was
the middle class. Quantitatively, only 2.3 percent of the industrialists in the sam-
p l ec a m ef r o mp e e r a g ea n dg e n t r y . 20 In contrast, as manyas 85 percent of the new
20If one adds ofﬁcers in the Army or Navy, classiﬁed by Crouzet as “upper class” the ﬁgure
goes up to 3.0 percent (see Crouzet’s Table 5).
40industrialists had a middle-class background.21 The contribution of the working
class was very moderate; no more than 12 percent of the industrialists belonged
to this class, which accounted for about 70 percent of the population.
Part of the explanation for the small number of aristocratic entrepreneurs is, of
course, that there were few aristocrats to begin with. But the differences in num-
bers donot explain the extent of the under-representation of the upperclasses. At
the beginning of the nineteenth century, peerage and gentry accounted for about
1.4 percent of the population, while the middle class made up slightly less than
30 percent. Thus, a much larger share of the middle class than of the peerage
and gentry ended up as entrepreneurs. If we relate the participation of the upper
class to their share of wealth owned instead of their share of the population, their
representation is surprisingly thin.
Even the estimate of 2.3 percent peers and gentry among the industrialists may
overstate the true involvement of the upper classes in entrepreneurial activities.
In many cases where landowners are listed among the founders of industrial un-
dertakings, they became involved only by virtue of owning the land on which
an industrial activity was to take place. In the majority of these cases, the aristo-
crats did not actively participate in the entrepreneurial process: “If they owned
blast-furnaces, forges and other establishments, they tended to lease them to ten-
antsratherthantooperatethemthroughsalariedmanagers...[They]wererather
passive lessors and investors than active business leaders” (Crouzet 1985 p. 68).
Similarly, in the textile industries “they were content to build (or to help to build)
mills and to lease them out” (Crouzet 1985 p. 74). Even the aristocracy’s involve-
ment in the ﬁnancing of mining and railways throughout the nineteenth century
rarely took the form of a direct involvement in entrepreneurial and managerial
aspects. Instead, landowners insisted on receiving regular periodical payments
over the sums invested, withot any participation in the risk or any commitment
21The middle class entrepreneurs in Crouzet’s classiﬁcation are a heterogeneous group includ-
ing bankers and rich merchants at the upper end, and small artisans and tenant farmers at the
lower end. A large proportion of them started with limited ﬁnancial resources, and made their
fortune entirely through self-ﬁnancedinvestment. As many as 27 percent of the men who entered
large-scale industry and 39 percent of the fathers of industrialists came from the lower ranks of
the middle class: shopkeepers, self-employed craftsmen, cultivators of various kind (Crouzet
(1985) p.127).
41to ﬁnancing the growth of the enterprises.
The marginal involvement of the aristocracy is surprising, given the extreme con-
centration of wealth in the hands of the landowning elite at the time. As late as
in 1880, less than 5000 landowners still owned more than 50 percent of all land
(Cannadine 1990). Given their enormous advantage in wealth, the aristocrats
should have been well placed to proﬁt from new technologies that are ultimately
based on capital investment.
6.3 Lack of Patience Versus Alternative Explanations
Clearly, lack of patience capital on behalf of the landowners is not the only possi-
ble explanation for the failure of the aristocracy to proﬁt from industrialization.
A complementary explanation for the success of the middle class is that urban
workers possessed skills that were essential for industrial activities, while the
landowners did not. While this factor must have also played a role, a number
of observations put into question whether it could, alone, explain such a major
social transformation. First of all, a large share of the new industrialists had not
previously been involved in manufacturing activity. For instance, as many as 22
percent of the industrialists’ fathers were yeomen and farmers, groups with no
history of previous involvement in industrial activity (Crouzet 1985).22 It seems
unlikely that these entrepreneurs possessed speciﬁc work skills suitable to indus-
trial activity. Moreover, there isevidenceof substantial mobility within industrial
sectors. For instance, the boom of the textile industry attracted many outsiders
into this thriving business. In 1787, 28 percent of the entrepreneurs in the textile
industry came from non-textile trades (Crouzet 1985, p.120). It therefore appears
that in terms of their skills, landowners were not at a particular disadvantage
relative to many of the middle-class entrepreneurs. In fact, during the industri-
alization, a number of important sectors (such as mining and railways) required
22On the other hand, tenant farmers wereheavily engaged in investments in agricultureduring
the eighteenth century, resulting in large productivity improvement. Since their access to capital
markets was limited, their consumption proﬁles must have been steeper than those of landown-
ers and laborers. Thus, it is conceivable that they had also accumulated a great deal of patience
capital.
421752–1799 1800–1849 1850–1899
Church 60 62 38
Land-Owning 14 14 7
Teaching 9 9 12
Law 6 9 14
Administration 3 1 6
Medicine 1 2 7
B a n k i n g 002
Business 0 0 5
O t h e r 739
Source: Jenkins and Jones (1950), Table 1
Table 2: Professional Choices of Cambridge Graduates, in Percent
land as a major input. In these sectors, if anything, the landowners should have
had an advantage over many of the middle-class city dwellers.
A related argument is that the landowners, busy with managing their rural es-
tates, may have lacked the time and opportunity to enter industrial activities,
which mostly took place in or near cities. However, many landowners did not
actively manage their estates, so in many cases this was not a binding constraint.
Even more telling, it was not only the heirs who owned estates who shunned
business activity, but also second and third sons of landowners. These younger
sons had no choice but to enter some activity other than landowning, and were
therefore clearly not held back by their obligations to an existing estate; never-
theless, they did not enter business in any larger numbers than their landowning
fathers. Table 2 reports the professional choice of Cambridge graduates during
the period 1750–1899. The vast majority of students at Cambridge during this pe-
riod were sons of members of the landowning class, so their professional choices
(other than landowning) give us a good idea of which professions younger sons
entered. Strikingly, until 1850, not a single graduate got involved in banking or
business (widely deﬁned as any “proﬁt-oriented activity”), and even after 1850
the percentage remains surprisingly low.
43Our hypothesis of the lack of patience among the aristocracy leads to a number
of additional implications that can be compared to historical evidence. In par-
ticular, a low time discount factor should make an aristocrat reluctant to invest
not only in new industrial enterprises, but also in ﬁnancial assets in general. In-
stead, we would expect the aristocracy to borrow from other groups in the pop-
ulation, in order to ﬁnance current consumption expenditures. These implica-
tions are supported by historical evidence. Well before the Industrial Revolution,
the British government was a major borrower in the economy, with multiple is-
sues of government bonds during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This
government borrowing was mostly ﬁnanced by the middle classes. “The bour-
geoisie were the most important individual investors in government loans. They
included members of the church, civil service and professions, but the majority
were merchants and ﬁnanciers, or, as smaller owners, tradesmen, craftsmen and
artisans.” (Dickson 1967, page 302). With regards to long-term bond holdings
by the landed aristocracy, Dickson concludes: “It seems fair to generalize that
the landed classes as a whole were not signiﬁcant contributors of new capital for
public loans” (Dickson 1967, page 302).
The same pattern can be found when we consider investments in public com-
panies. Bowen (1989) describes the composition of stockholders of the East In-
dia Company between 1756 and 1791 as being well-represented by “clergymen,
bankers, military and naval personnel, ofﬁcials, brokers, merchants large and
small, and retailers.” Regarding the upper classes, Bowen concludes: “One issue
of central importance is beyond doubt: there was no large-scale investment in
the [East India] Company by the landed interest or aristocracy.” (p. 195).
In summary, we ﬁnd that even well before the Industrial Revolution the landed
elite plays a surprisingly minor role in ﬁnancing government borrowing and pri-
vate enterprise, despite the fact thatthis group was farwealthierthan the middle-
class investors. This behavior stands in marked contrast to the wealth elites in
modern industrial countries, which generally own a disproportionate share of
most classes of assets, including government debt and public stock.23
23For the case of the United States see Carroll (2001) who documents that “rich households are
more likely to own virtually every kind of asset.”
44While the lack of ﬁnancial investment by the aristocracy is indicative of low pa-
tience, the evidence is not yet conclusive. If investments in the aristocracy’s agri-
cultural estates carried a higher return than ﬁnancial assets, it may be the case
that the upper classes merely held a different (and possibly more proﬁtable) port-
foliothanthemiddleclasses, evenwiththesamepreferenceson theconsumption-
savings margin. However, this interpretation is contradicted by two observa-
tions. The ﬁrst observation is the style in which they managed their own estates.
During the course of the 1700, we observe a progressive withdrawal from day-
to-day involvement with farming in both France and Britain. Investments and
technical innovation in agriculture were carried out almost exlusively by tenant
farmers, not by landowners, who remained content with relying on safe ﬂat rents
(see Thompson (1994)).
The second observation is the evidence that the landed aristocracy, rather than
investing the rents from their estates in interest-bearing activities, borrowed in-
creasing amounts of resources to ﬁnance luxury consumption. Borrowing by
the aristocracy had been common long before the Industrial Revolution. Beckett
(1986) reports that by the mid-eighteenth century “many families already had an
accumulation [of debt] several generations old” (p. 300). Typically, the majority
of this debt was not taken on to improve existing estates or to buy more land,
but resulted from a failure to match expenditure to income: “Rents and royalties
were apparently being sucked into conspicuous consumption and frittered away
in spiraling marriage contracts; and the gap between getting and spending was
ﬁlled not by ofﬂoading assets such as land, but by borrowing from—in effect—
the commercial, industrial and shopkeeping members of the populace.” (Beckett
1986, page 316). Indebtness grew severely during the nineteenth Century. One
1847 writer claimed that “between half and two-thirds of English land was en-
cumbered (i.e. mortgaged)” (Beckett 1986, page 315). Cannadine (1994) summa-
rizes the situation as follows: “Whatever might have been the ﬁnancial state of
ﬁnancial families, it seems clear that the landed aristocracy as a class was in debt
through the ﬁrst three-quarters of the nineteenth century” (p. 49). While some of
this debt was raised for investment in non-agricultural ventures, “the ﬁrst [cate-
gory] was spending which had its objective the enhancement of the social pres-
tige and the fulﬁllment of the traditional responsibilities of the landowner [...]
45To the extent that such self-indulgent activities were ﬁnanced from middle- and
working-classsavings,[...] thisdeﬁnitelyamountedtoa‘haemorrhageofcap-
ital,’ a ‘misallocation of resources,’ as funds from urban and industrial Britain
were diverted to underpin the indulgence of the landed order” (p. 48–49).
These views are corroborated by a number of sources describing the extrava-
gant consumption habits of the aristocracy. In an analysis of landowners in the
Glasgow area between 1770-1815, Devine (1971) argues that extensive expendi-
tures can be attributed to what has been dubbed a “Revolution in Manners” on
the part of the landed gentry. 24 T h es a m ea u t h o rd o c u m e n t st h a td e s p i t et h e
fact that land rents were rising during the period, a number of old families in-
creased consumption even faster than income, and were ultimately forced to sell
their estates. These views are echoed by Porter (1982), who describes the eigh-
teenth century as the golden age for the landed aristocracy, but also notes that the
tide of wealth ﬂowed out as fast as it came to ﬁnance an increasingly expensive
lifestyle.25
In contrast, the new industrialists were regarded by their contemporaries as par-
simonious beings, eager to accumulate wealth. According to accounts of the
time reported by Crouzet (1985), most Mancunian manufacturers of the late eigh-
teenth century “commenced their careers in business with but slenders capitals
[...]Patience,industryandperseverancewastheirprincipalstock”(p.37).Sim-
ilarly, the cotton spinner John Kennedy declared in 1828 that “the only men who
have madetheirfortunes [in Manchester] have beenthose whostarted with noth-
ing. They lived only for their businesses, and brought up in the habits of strict
24He writes: “The desire for an increased standard of living among the aristocracy and landed
gentryledseveralofthemtoliveabovetheirmeans. Morevariedleisureactivities,moreelaborate
clothing, ‘improvement’ of estates, more exotic diets all required an increased income. Such
were the pressures of social competition and convention that often desires were fulﬁlled on very
narrow ﬁnancial margins” (page 218).
25Here are some examples: “Sir Robert Walpole’s private expenditure between 1714 an 1718
totaled £90,000. Walpole and his guests at Houghton Hall in Norfolk downed about £1,500a year
inwine[...] BedfordHousehadforty-twoservantswhocost£859 a year. Political and electoral
expensesranintothousands[...] Marriagesettlements[...] becameheavierdrainsonfortunes
[...] V ast capital fortunes were sunk in building [...] Prodigal peers and their heirs ran up
astronomicaldebts[...] MagnatesransackedEuropeforpaintings,sculpture,furniture,jewelry .
They patronized artists and poets, and collected antiques, scientiﬁc instruments and books by the
roomful” (p. 59–60).
46economy.”
The Demise of the British Aristocracy
During the early phases of the Industrial Revolution, the landowning class re-
tained most of its political inﬂuence, and continued to account for a large fraction
of overall wealth. While industrial fortunes were growing fast, the new indus-
trialists usually started with little initial wealth, and therefore took some time to
catch up with the major landowners. In addition, the rapid population growth
increased the demand for food, which led to a substantial, if temporary, increase
in the value of land. In the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, large fortunes were
by and large still associated with land ownership. Rubinstein (1981) reports that
among the 189 individuals who died between 1809 and 1858 with a fortune ex-
ceeding one million pounds, 95 percent were wealthy landowners.
After 1880, however, the rental income from land started to decline, and was
no longer sufﬁcient to maintain the lavish lifestyle to which the aristocracy had
been accustomed. The aristocrats reacted by increasing even further their al-
ready chronic indebtness. Many families became overburdened by debt, until
they were forced to sell off parts or all of their estates. Cannadine (1990) writes:
“Above all, there was a massive dispersal of land, throughout the British Isles,
as estates tumbed into the market in the years immediately before and after the
First World War. The scale of this territorial transfer was rivaled only by two
other landed revolutions in Britain this Millennium: The Norman Conquest and
the Dissolution of the Monasteries” (p. 89). As a result, the land distribution in
modern times is nowhere near as concentrated as it was early in the nineteenth
century (see Cannadine 1990, 1994). A century after the start of the Industrial
Revolution, landowners no longer featured prominently among the wealthiest
families in the country. Between 1900 and 1939, only 7 percent of the 273 in-
dividuals who died as millionaires belonged to the landed elite.26 Among the
non-landed millionaires, about half of the new fortunes were generated in the
26See Rubinstein (1981), Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
47manufacturing sector, with most of the rest accounted for by commerce and ﬁ-
nance.
Economic decline ultimately led to waning political inﬂuence. By a series of fran-
chise extensions throughout the nineteenth century, voting rights were extended
to the entire male population, and as a consequence the landowning class, which
made up only a small fraction of total population, could no longer exert much
political power. Even during the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, when voting
rights were still limited, the major political debates (concerning, for example, the
repeal of the Corn Laws) were increasingly resolved in favor of the industrialists,
and against the landowning interest. By the dawn of the twentieth century, the
aristocracy’s economic and political dominance, at its peak a mere hundred years
earlier, had been irrevocably lost.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a theory that relies on endogenous investments in pa-
tience to explain the economic decline of the aristocracy after the start of the
I n d u s t r i a lR e v o l u t i o n ,a sw e l la st h et h e emergence of a class of industrialists
from middle-class origins. Our theory provides a link between a literature em-
phasizing the role of technological change in long-run growth, and a literature
that focuses on the role of political reforms and institutions for economic de-
velopment. Technological change is important in our model, because the latent
class differences in terms of patience only become paramount after the arrival of
a new investment-based technology. Following this technological impulse, the
model provides an account of the relative economic fortune of different classes,
which in itself was a driving force behind many of the political and institutional
changes that followed the Industrial Revolution.
The theory provides a new perspective of the impact of ﬁnancial market frictions
on economic development. In our model, the absence of ﬁnancial markets imply
that incentives for investing in patience differ across classes and occupations. In
an environment where upper-class wealth is based on land ownership (which
48provides relatively ﬂat returns over the life cycle), it is members of investment-
intensive middle-class occupations that become the most patient. As a result,
middle-classentrepreneurs ultimately leapfrog over the stagnant upperclass and
become economically dominant. This view stands in contrast to an existing lit-
erature on inequality and development, which emphasizes that ﬁnancial market
imperfections may exclude poorer individuals from proﬁtable investment. The
existing literature may provide another reason for the exclusion of the working
class from entrepreneurial activity, but it cannot explain why middle-class en-
trepreneurs surpassed the existing wealth elite at the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution.
The theory alsohighlight a new implication of ﬁnancial development: by increas-
ing the possibilities for agents to smooth consumption, well-developed ﬁnancial
markets reduce the extent to which incentives to invest in patience vary across
families engaged in different occupations. Thus, ﬁnancial development leads to
more homogeneous preferences within the population. To this end, our analy-
sis suggests that in pre-industrial times members of different classes were really
distinct from each other on a fundamental level (in addition to the obvious differ-
encesinwealthandpower), justasthecontemporary observers generallyseemed
to believe. In modern societies with rich ﬁnancial markets, the assumption that
members of all classes have the same underlying preferences (as is usually as-
sumed in economic modeling) may be more appropriate.
49A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 The Sequential Formulation of the Decision Problem
The sequential formulation of the decision problem is given by:
v









Bt+1 =( 1− ν)Bt + f(lt),
it ∈ I,
lt ∈ (0,1).
A.2 Proofs for all Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: The proof is an application of Corollary 1 to Theorem 3.2
in Stokey andLucas (1989). TheBellman equation (2)deﬁnesa mappingT on the
space of bounded continuous functions on the interval [0,B max],e n d o w e dw i t h
the sup norm, where the mapping is given by:
Tv(B)= s u p
i∈I,0≤l≤1
{u(y1,i)h(1 − l)+Bu(y2,i)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l))}. (19)
Sinceweassume0 <z<1, thismappingisacontraction byBlackwell’ssufﬁcient
conditions, and it therefore has a unique ﬁxed point by the Contraction Mapping
Theorem. Using Corollary 1, we can now establish that the value function (the
ﬁxed point of the mapping T) is increasing and weakly convex by establishing
that the operator T preserves these properties.
Toestablish thatthevaluefunction isincreasing, letv beanon-decreasingbounded
continuous function. We need to show that Tv is a strictly increasing function.
To do this, choose B>B. We now need to establish that Tv(B) >Tv (B).S i n c e
the right-hand side of (19) is the maximization of a continuous function over a
compact set, the maximum is attained. Let l and {y
1,y
2} be choices attaining the
maximum for B.W et h e nh a v e :
Tv(B) ≥ u(y
1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y
1)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l))
>u (y
1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y
1)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l)) = Tv(B),
50which is the desired result. Here the weak inequality follows because the choices
l,{y
1,y
2} may not be maximizing at B, and the strict inequality follows because
v is assumed to be increasing, and we have that B>Band u(y
2) > 0.
To establish convexity of the value function, let v be a (weakly) convex bounded
continuous function. We need to establish that Tvis also a convex function. To
show this, choose a number θ such that 0 <θ<1,l e tB>B ,a n dl e tB =
θB +( 1− θ)B. We now need to show that θTv(B)+( 1− θ)Tv(B) ≥ Tv(B).L e tl
and {y1,y 2} be choices attaining the maximum for B. Since these are feasible, but
not necessarily optimal choices at B and B,w eh a v e :
Tv(B) ≥ u(y1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y2)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l)),
Tv(B) ≥ u(y1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y2)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l)).
Working towards the desired condition, we therefore have:
θTv(B)+( 1− θ)Tv(B) ≥θ


u(y1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y2)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l))






θv((1 − ν)B + f(l)) + (1 − θ)v((1 − ν)B + f(l))

≥u(y1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y2)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l))
=Tv(B),
which is the required condition. Here, the last inequality follows from the as-
sumed convexity of v. The operator T therefore preserves convexity, and thus
the ﬁxed point must also be convex. Notice that linearity is key to this result: the
discount factor enters linearly utility, and the parental discount factor has a linear
effect on the discount factor of the child. 
Proof of Proposition 2: We start by showing that the steepness of the optimal in-
come proﬁle is non-decreasing in B, and that the optimal investment in patience
l(B) is non-decreasing in B. Fix two current discount factors B < B, and let the
corresponding optimal choices be l,y
1,y
2 and l,y1,y2. Wewant to show that l ≤ l,
y
1 ≥ y1,a n dy
2 ≤ y2.
Since the choices are optimizing for the B and B agents, the following inequali-
ties must be satisﬁed at the optimal choices:
u(y1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y2)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l))
≥ u(y
1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y
2)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l)), (20)
51u(y1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y2)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l))
≤ u(y
1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y
2)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l)), (21)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from optimization at B and the second from















v((1 − ν)B + f(l)) − v((1 − ν)B + f(l))

. (22)
Here, the sign of the left-hand side is equal to the sign of y2 − y
2,a n d ,b e c a u s e
of the convexity of v and the fact that f is increasing, the right-hand side is non-
negative if l ≤ l, and non-positive if l ≥ l. Taken these implications together, (22)
implies that we must have y2 ≥ y
2 or l ≥ l, because otherwise the left-hand side
is negative and the right-hand side is non-negative. Thus, so far we know that
at least one of our two claims, namely that patient agents choose steeper income
proﬁles and invest more in patience, must be true. To show that in fact both are
true, we now proceed to establish that each implies the other.
Let us therefore assume that l ≥ l. Optimization in the choice of the income
proﬁle implies the following inequalities:
u(y1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y2) ≥ u(y
1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y
2), (23)
u(y1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y2) ≤ u(y
1)h(1 − l)+Bu(y
2). (24)















Since l ≥ l and h is strictly increasing, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is
non-negative. Therefore, we must have y2 ≥ y
2 and, consequently, y1 ≤ y
1 since
otherwise the left-hand side is negativea n dt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d en o n - n e g a t i v e .
Conversely, suppose we already know that y2 ≥ y
2, which also implies that y1 ≤
y
1. We want to establish that l ≥ l. Optimization in the choice of l implies:
u(y1)h(1 − l)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l)) ≥ u(y1)h(1 − l)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l)), (25)
u(y
1)h(1 − l)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l)) ≤ u(y
1)h(1 − l)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l)). (26)
















v((1 − ν)B + f(l)) − v((1 − ν)B + f(l))

. (27)
Here, the ﬁrst term on the left-hand side is non-positive. If y1 <y
1,w em u s th a v e
l ≥ l, because otherwise the left-hand side is negative and the right hand side is
non-negative, because ofthe convexity of v. If, on theother hand, y1 = y
1,t h el ef t -
hand side is zero, and we must therefore ensure that the right-hand side is non-
positive. Here two cases need to be distinguished, depending on the curvature of
v.F i r s t ,i fv is strictly convex anywhere on the interval [(1−ν)B+f(min{l,l}),(1−
ν)B + f(max{l,l})],w em u s th a v et h a tl ≥ l, because otherwise the right-hand
side is strictly positive. Second, it is also possible that v is exactly linear over the
relevant range, in which case both the left- and right-hand sides of (27) are zero,
regardless of l and l. To satisfy (27), in this case both (25) and (26) must hold
as inequalities, implying that both agents are indifferent between l and l.G i v e n
that v is linear over the relevant range, our concavity assumptions on h (strict
concavity) and f imply that (given the optimal income proﬁle) for each agent
there is a unique optimal l. Therefore, we must have l = l, and once again the
desired condition is satisﬁed. 
Proof of Proposition 3: In Proposition 2, we established that the steepness of the
optimal income proﬁle is increasing in B, and that the optimal choice of invest-
ment in patience l(B) is also increasing in B. It then follows that the patience as
well as the steepness of the income proﬁles of all future members of a dynasty
(child, grandchild etc.) are increasing in the patience of the current member of a
dynasty.
Since there are only ﬁnitely many occupations, we can subdivide the state space
[0,B max] into ﬁnitely many closed intervals (they are closed because of our con-
tinuity assumptions), where each interval corresponds to the choice of a given
occupation i. The agent is just indifferent between two occupations at the bound-
ary of two such intervals, and strictly prefers a given occupation in the interior
of such an interval. The intervals can be further subdivided according to the oc-
cupational choice of the child. Since l(B) may not be singled valued, there may
be multiple optimal B  corresponding to a given B today. Nevertheless, since the
B  are strictly increasing in B (because of Proposition 2 and ν<1) and given that
there are only ﬁnitely many occupations, we can once again subdivide today’s
state space in ﬁnitely many close intervals, each one corresponding to a speciﬁc
occupational choice of the child, such that the intervals only overlap only at their
53boundary points. Continuing this way, the state space [0,B max] can be divided
into a countable number of closed intervals (there is a ﬁnite number of possible
occupations in each of the countably many future generations), where each inter-
val corresponds to a speciﬁc occupational choice of each generation. Let [B,B]
be such an interval. We want to establish that the value function is linear over
this interval, and that the optimal choice of patience l(B) is single-valued and
constant over the interior of this interval.
It is useful to consider the sequential formulation (18) of the decision problem.
Taking the present and future occupational choices it as given, we can substitute























For given current and future income proﬁles, (28) is strictly concave in lt for all
t,s i n c eh is assumed to be strictly concave, and f is weakly concave. Moreover,
the discount factor B and all expressions involving lt appear in separate terms
in the sum. Therefore, it follows that, given the optimal income proﬁles, for all
t the optimal lt is unique, and independent of B. Since on the interior of [B,B],
the current and future optimal income proﬁles are unique, the optimal policy
correspondence l(B) is single-valued. At the boundary between two intervals
there are (by construction of the intervals) at least two different optimal income
proﬁles for atleastonegeneration, hencel(B) m ayt ak eo nm o r et h ano n eo pt i m al
value, one corresponding to each optimal set of income proﬁles.
The optimal value function v over the interval [B,B] is given by (28) with income
proﬁles it and investment in patience lt ﬁxed at their optimal (and constant) val-
ues. (28) is linear in B; it therefore follows that the value function is piece-wise
linear, with each kink corresponding to the boundary between two of our inter-
vals. 
Proof of Proposition 4: The law of motion g :[ 0 ,B max] → [0,B max] for B is given
by:
g(B)=( 1− ν)B + f (l(B)),
where l(B) is a non-decreasing step-function (as described in Proposition 3).
Since f is an increasing function and we assume that ν<1, the law of motion
g(B) is strictly increasing in B.N o t i c et h a tg(B) may not be single valued for all
54B. Strictly increasing here means that B<Bimplies B
 
<B




  ∈ g(B),e v e ni fg(B) or g(B) i sas e t .F o rag i v e nB0, the law of motion
g deﬁnes (potentially multiple) optimal sequences of discount factors {Bt}∞
t=0.
Any such sequence is a monotone sequence on the compact set [0,B max],a n d
must therefore converge. Notice, however, that since l(B) is not single-valued
everywhere, different steady-states can be reached even from the same initial B0.

Proof of Proposition 5: That the only income proﬁle chosen in equilibrium are
those maximizing y1,I + y2,i/R is an immediate consequence of the fact that, un-
der perfect capital markets, agents can allocate consumption optimally given any
present value of income. Therefore, only the present value of income matters.
Thus, agents only choose professions yielding the maximum attainable present
value of income. That the parents investment in patience does not depend on
which among the professions that maximize the present value of income is cho-
sen by the future offsprings is also an immediate consequence of the fact that,
under perfect capital markets, consumption proﬁles are decoupled from income
proﬁles.
To establish that the value function is increasing and convex, we proceed as inthe
proof of Proposition 2. To establish that it is increasing, let v be a non-decreasing
bounded continuous function. We show that Tvis a strictly increasing function.
For this purpose, choose B>B. As discussed in the other proof, we need
to establish that Tv(B) >T v (B).L e tc1 and c2 denote consumption in the two
periods of adult life, given a professional choice that maximizesthe present value
of income. Let l be the choice that attain the maximum for B.W et h e nh a v e :
Tv(B) ≥ u(c1)h(1 − l)+Bu(c2)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l))
>u(c1)h(1 − l)+Bu(c2)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l)) = Tv(B),
which is the desired result. As in the proof of Proposition 2, the weak inequality
follows because the choice l,c 1 and c2 may not be maximizing at B, and the strict
inequality follows because v is assumed to be increasing, and we have B>B
and u(c2) > 0.
Toestablish theconvexity ofthevaluefunction, letv bea(weakly)convexbounded
continuous function. We need to establish that Tv is also a convex function as
well. To show this, let θ be such that 0 <θ<1,l e tB>B ,a n dl e tB =
θB +( 1− θ)B. We now need to show that θTv(B)+( 1− θ)Tv(B) ≥ Tv(B).
Let l be the choice that attains the maximum for B. Since this is feasible, but not
55necessarily an optimal choice at B and B,w eh a v e :
Tv(B) ≥ u(c1)h(1 − l)+Bu(c2)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l)),
Tv(B) ≥ u(c1)h(1 − l)+Bu(c2)+zv((1 − ν)B + f(l)).
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 2 leads to establish that:
θTv(B)+( 1− θ)Tv(B) ≥ Tv(B),
which is the required condition. 
Proof of Proposition 6: Concerning occupational segregation, ﬁrst notice that for
each cohort an equal number of parents and children end up working in each of
the two professions, since the relative supply of labor in the two sectors must be
constant. Next, since according to Propositions 3 and 4 the choice of occupation
is increasing in patience B (when occupations are ordered by the steepness of the
income proﬁle), the patience of any artisan is larger than or equal to the patience
of any worker. Finally, the patience of any artisan’s child is strictly larger than the
patience of any worker’s child, since the child’s patience is strictly increasing in
the parent’s patience and occupational choice. The artisans’ children as a group
are therefore strictly more patient than the workers’ children, which implies that
they must be those who choose to be artisans in the next generation.
That patience must converge in each dynasty follows from Proposition 4. It re-
mains to be shown that agricultural workers and landowners converge to the
same patience BW, whereas artisans converge to BA >B W. To this end, consider
the ﬁrst-order condition for investment in patience (6) under CRRA preferences:
h  











Notice that only the income ratio y2/y1 enters the condition; the level is irrele-
vant. Since agricultural workers and landowners have the same steepness of the
income proﬁle (y2/y1 =1 ), they converge to the same patience BW.A r t i s a n s
have a steeper proﬁle y2/y1 = γ, and consequently converge to a higher level of
patience BA >B W. 
Proof of Proposition 7: We start be establishing the following claim. Let u(c)=

















































are increasing, convex functions.
Consider, to this aim, the occupational choice of the ﬁrst (and second) generation
g i v e nt h ee x p e c t a t i o no fa nE C Ww i t hµ unskilled workers. 27 Since, initially, all



















denote, respectively, the value of being a worker
and an artisan conditional on µ and the expectation that all future generations
will stick to the occupational choice of their parents. Clearly, there can be no
equilibrium with µ =0 , since the unskilled wage would in this case become


























)I nt h i sc a s e ,µ =1 , and all dynasties choose to be unskilled workers.










. Thus, if an ECW exists, it is unique.
So far, we have assumed that children will choose the same profession as their
parents. The last step to establish the existence of an ECW is to show that this is
indeed optimal. Consider the case in which the solution is interior ( µ ∈ (0,1))
– the other case is straighhtforward –. The analysis of section 3 establishes that
artisans will invest more in their children’s patience than unskilled workers. In
fact, since ˜ B ∈ [ ¯ BA, ¯ BM] and convergence in discount factors is monotonic (see
Proposition 4), the net accumulation of patience capital is non-positive for the
unskilled dynasties and non-negative for the skilled dynasties (and non-zero for
at least one group). In particular, let B2,A and B2,M be the discount factors of
the generation that becomes adult in period 2. Then, if the parents’ choice was
27To avoid uninteresting complications arising from corner solutions, we focus on parameter
values such that the ECW value of µ is larger than one half. This implies that even if all old adults
are unskilled workers, some young adult will also choose to be unskilled. This assumption is
historically plausible since well more than half of the population was employed in the ruralsector
before the Industrial Revolution. Moreover, we ignore throughout the uninteresting case where
the equilibrium features no employment in artisanry.









. Moreover, by Proposition 2, the steepness of the
optimal income proﬁle is non-decreasing in B. Since the income proﬁle is steeper
for artisans than for unskilled workers, this implies that
vA (B2,A|µ) ≥ vM (B2,A|µ),
νA (B2,M |µ) ≤ vM (B2,M |µ),
and that children will stick to their parents’ profession. The same argument ap-
plies for the following periods. 
Proof of Proposition 8: We start by guessing that v(B,K)=KσV (B) and that













σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l))

,
subject to (3), (13) and K  ≤ (1 − δ + A)K,a n d0 ≤ l ≤ 1. Dividing both sides of
the expression by Kσ, and substituting in the constraints, we obtain expression
(16).
To establish that V is increasing, we need to show that, given the guess that V is
strictly increasing, TV is a strictly increasing function. To this aim, let B>B.
We need to establish that TV(B) >TV(B).L e tl and k be choices that attain the
maximum for B. Then:
TV(B) ≥ ((1 − δ + A) − k)
σ h(1 − l)+B (Ak)
σ + zk
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l))
> ((1 − δ + A) − k)
σ h(1 − l)+B (Ak)
σ + zk
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l))
= TV(B)
where the strict inequality comes from the guess that V is an increasing function.
To establish the convexity of the value function, we need to establish that, given
the guess that V is convex, Tvis also a convex function. Let θ be such that 0 <
θ<1,l e tB>B ,a n dl e tB = θB +( 1− θ)B. We now need to show that
θTV(B)+(1−θ)TV(B) ≥ TV(B).L e tl and k be choices that attain the maximum
for B. Since these are feasible, but not necessarily optimal choices at B and B,w e
58have:
TV(B) ≥ ((1 − δ + A) − k)
σ h(1 − l)+B (Ak)
σ + zk
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l)),
TV(B) ≥ ((1 − δ + A) − k)
σ h(1 − l)+B (Ak)
σ + zk
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l)).
Hence,
θTV(B)+( 1− θ)TV(B)
≥((1 − δ + A) − k)





θV((1 − ν)B + f(l)) + (1 − θ)V ((1 − ν)B + f(l))

≥((1 − δ + A) − k)
σ h(1 − l)+B (Ak)
σ + zk
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l))
=TV(B),
which is the required condition. Note that the last inequality follows from the
assumed convexity of V .
Next, we want to show that k is non-decreasing in B,a n dt h a tl is non-decreasing
in B. To this aim, once more ﬁx two current discount factors B < B, and let the
corresponding optimal choices be l,kand l,k. We want to show that l ≤ l and
k ≤ k.
Since the choices are optimizing for the B and B agents, the following inequali-
ties must be satisﬁed at the optimal choices:

(1 − δ + A) − ¯ k
σ h(1 − l)+B(Ak)
σ + z¯ k
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l))
≥ ((1 − δ + A) − k)
σ h(1 − l)+B(Ak)
σ + zk
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l)), (31)

(1 − δ + A) − ¯ k
σ h(1 − l)+B(Ak)
σ + z¯ k
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l))
≤ ((1 − δ + A) − k)
σ h(1 − l)+B(Ak)
σ + zk
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l)), (32)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from optimization at B and the second from


















V ((1 − ν)B + f(l)) − V ((1 − ν)B + f(l))

. (33)





of the convexity of V and the fact that f is increasing, the right-hand side is non-
negative if k ≤ k and l ≤ l, and non-positive if k ≥ k and l ≥ l. Taken together,
59these implications of(33) implythat we must have k ≥ k or l ≥ l,o rb o t h ,b e c a u s e
otherwise the left-hand side is negativea n dt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d en o n - n e g a t i v e ,
which would violate the inequality. To show that in fact both are true, we now
proceed to establish that each implies the other.
Let us assume, ﬁrst, that l ≥ l. Optimization in the choice of k implies the follow-
ing inequalities:

(1 − δ + A) − ¯ k
σ h(1 − l)+B(Ak)
σ + z¯ k
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l))
≥ ((1 − δ + A) − k)
σ h(1 − l)+B(Ak)
σ + zk
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l)),

(1 − δ + A) − ¯ k
σ h(1 − l)+B(Ak)
σ + z¯ k
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l))
≤ ((1 − δ + A) − k)
σ h(1 − l)+B(Ak)
σ + zk
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l)).

















h(1 − l) − h(1 − l)


(1 − δ + A) − ¯ k
σ − ((1 − δ + A) − k)
σ
Since l ≥ l and h is strictly increasing, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is non-
negative. We must therefore have that k ≥ k, because otherwise the left-hand
side is negative and the right-hand side non-negative, which would violate the
inequality.
Conversely, suppose that k ≥ k. We want to establish that this implies that l ≥ l.
Optimization in the choice of l implies:

(1 − δ + A) − ¯ k
σ h(1 − l)+z¯ k
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l))
≥

(1 − δ + A) − ¯ k
σ h(1 − l)+z¯ k
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l)),
((1 − δ + A) − k)
σ h(1 − l)+zk
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l))
≤ ((1 − δ + A) − k)
σ h(1 − l)+zk
σV ((1 − ν)B + f(l)).
Combining the two conditions one more time, we get:


(1 − δ + A) − ¯ k
σ − ((1 − δ + A) − k)
σ











V ((1 − ν)B + f(l)) − V ((1 − ν)B + f(l))

.
60The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side is non-positive. Thus, we must have l ≥ l,
because otherwise the left-hand side is negative and the right hand side is non-
negative, because of the convexity of V .
Therefore, we have established that both policy functions l(B) and k(B) are
weakly increasing, and the proof is completed. 
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